For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate by Gaylord, Scott W.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 3 
2014 
For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate 
Scott W. Gaylord 
Elon University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 589 
(2014). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
589 
FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, FREE EXERCISE, 
AND THE HHS MANDATE 
SCOTT W. GAYLORD

 
ABSTRACT 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, most employers 
must provide their employees with health insurance that covers all FDA-
approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures (the “HHS 
mandate”). Across the country, individuals, religious schools, and 
corporations have sued to enjoin the mandate, arguing, among other 
things, that it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). These cases 
require the federal courts to sort out the complex relationship between the 
Free Exercise Clause and laws that are alleged to be neutral and 
generally applicable, such as the HHS mandate. But they also raise a 
novel threshold question: whether corporations can exercise religion 
under the First Amendment and RFRA. As several federal courts have 
noted, whether secular corporations can exercise religion is an open 
question. To date, this question has confounded the courts, resulting in a 
split between the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits as well as 
the numerous district courts that have ruled on challenges to the HHS 
mandate. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in two of these 
cases, Hobby Lobby (Tenth Circuit) and Conestoga Wood Specialties 
(Third Circuit). This Article analyzes this novel and unresolved issue, 
arguing that the Supreme Court should follow its reasoning in Bellotti and 
Citizens United and hold that, just as corporations can engage in free 
speech, for-profit corporations can exercise religion under the Free 
Exercise Clause and RFRA.  
 
 
  The author is the Jennings Professor and Emerging Scholar at Elon University School of Law 
where he teaches First Amendment and Constitutional Law. The author had primary responsibility for 
preparing amicus curiae briefs to the United States Supreme Court as well as the Third, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Tenth Circuits in cases challenging the HHS mandate. These amicus briefs address many of the 
legal issues discussed in this Article. 
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Although never having addressed this specific issue, I argue that the 
Supreme Court has established rules for determining whether 
corporations can invoke particular constitutional rights and that, under 
these rules, corporations can invoke the protection of the Free Exercise 
Clause. The Third and Sixth Circuits, along with several district courts 
have reached the opposite conclusion, while several others have avoided 
the issue altogether. Relying primarily on a single footnote in Bellotti, the 
courts denying free exercise protection to for-profit corporations maintain 
that the free exercise of religion is a “purely personal” right that is 
limited to individuals and religious non-profit organizations. This Article 
contends, however, that a more detailed review of Bellotti, Citizens 
United, and the Court’s other decisions regarding the constitutional rights 
of corporations reveals that free exercise, like the freedom of speech, is 
not a “purely personal” right. Consequently, corporations—whether for-
profit or non-profit—can claim its protection. Moreover, in the wake of 
Bellotti and Citizens United, neither the “profit motive” of a for-profit 
corporation nor the “religious nature” of religious organizations (e.g., 
churches) justifies limiting the Free Exercise Clause only to individuals 
and non-profit religious organizations. Although many (perhaps most) 
corporations may choose not to engage in religious activities, there is no 
constitutional basis for precluding a priori all for-profit businesses from 
raising free exercise claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
1
 has 
not received a lot of attention from the Supreme Court or the circuit courts 
of appeals.
2
 That is about to change. The Third and Tenth Circuits recently 
decided challenges to the mandatory contraception coverage provisions 
(“HHS mandate”) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”), and twelve other ACA cases are pending in five different federal 
circuit courts. To date, the federal courts have reached disparate 
conclusions regarding whether the HHS mandate violates the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 
Given that some circuit courts of appeals have granted injunctions on 
appeal while other have not, the circuit courts are apt to reach conflicting 
conclusions—as evidenced by the split between the Third and Tenth 
Circuits—thereby creating the need for the Supreme Court to resolve the 
important free exercise and RFRA claims raised in these cases.
3
  
Under the ACA, most businesses are required to provide certain 
minimum levels of health care coverage to their employees, including no-
cost coverage for preventive care and screening for women.
4
 Pursuant to 
regulations promulgated in relation to the preventive care for women, 
these businesses must provide health plans that cover all FDA-approved 
contraception and sterilization procedures.
5
 Confronted with these new 
requirements, business owners across the country have challenged the 
ACA regulations, arguing that the new regulations force companies to 
 
 
 1.  The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. In 2012, the Supreme Court unanimously approved the “ministerial exception,” which 
acknowledges the freedom of religious institutions to select their ministers and, in turn, precludes 
certain employment discrimination claims against religious institutions. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). Although an important decision on a 
question of First Amendment law that the Court had not previously addressed, Hosanna-Tabor 
affirmed a doctrine that “the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized.” Id. at 705. Accordingly, 
the Court did not have to decide a completely novel free exercise claim. 
 3. See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits On The Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2013, at A1. (“‘This is highly likely to end up at the Supreme Court,’ said Douglas Laycock, a law 
professor at the University of Virginia and one of the country’s top scholars on church-state conflicts. 
‘There are so many cases, and we are already getting strong disagreements among the circuit 
courts.’”). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
 5. See Women’s Preventive Servs. Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands Prevention 
Coverage for Women's Health and Well-Being, HRSA.GOV, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/5
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cover procedures and drugs that are inconsistent with the faiths of the 
individual owners and the religious values upon which their businesses are 
based. For example, some business owners and their corporations object to 
all forms of contraception based on their religious beliefs. Others are 
primarily concerned because they believe that some of these 
contraceptives act as abortifacients.
6
 The HHS mandate, therefore, 
requires these employers, who seek to implement their religious beliefs in 
and through their companies, to provide and pay for health coverage that 
violates their sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and RFRA. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in National 
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, which upheld the ACA 
under Congress’s taxing power, Congress has broad power to regulate the 
medical field and to pass legislation directed at curtailing health care 
costs.
7
 The HHS mandate cases, however, raise a different and extremely 
important question regarding the ACA: whether the federal government 
can force individuals and businesses to provide medical coverage for 
procedures that directly contradict their religious tenets. Although the 
federal courts have consistently recognized that individuals have free 
exercise rights, the pending HHS mandate cases require the courts to look 
more closely at the proper scope of religious exercise under the Free 
Exercise Clause and RFRA. If the federal government can require 
businesses and their owners to provide health coverage that includes 
access to services contrary to the owners’ religious beliefs, there may be 
no limit to the government’s power to infringe on and contravene the 
religious tenets of business owners and their companies.  
The HHS mandate, therefore, raises an entirely novel First Amendment 
question: whether for-profit corporations have free exercise rights.
8
 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 
2012); Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
 7. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that the individual mandate, which requires most individuals 
to purchase health insurance or pay a tax, exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause but 
is constitutional under the Taxing Clause). 
 8. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2013) (“whether Citizens United is applicable to the Free Exercise Clause 
is a question of first impression”); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(“These arguments [regarding the free exercise rights of for-profit corporations] pose difficult 
questions of first impression.”). See also Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 
106, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that “whether for-profit corporations can exercise religion within the 
meaning of the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause” is an “unresolved question”); Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Neither the Supreme Court 
nor the Third Circuit have had occasion to decide whether for-profit, secular corporations possess the 
religious rights held by individuals.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Because the federal courts have not previously been called on to address 
this issue, there are no cases “concluding that secular, for-profit 
corporations . . . have a constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion.”9 Of course, the opposite is true as well: the “conclusory 
assertion that a corporation has no constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion is unsupported by any cited authority.”10 Thus, the HHS mandate 
cases present a unique opportunity for the Supreme Court to establish the 
proper guidelines for corporate free exercise under RFRA and the First 
Amendment. 
While the lack of precedent may suggest that the lower federal courts 
are writing on a tabula rasa with respect to corporate free exercise rights, 
the slate is not as blank as several district courts have suggested. In 2010, 
the Court confirmed in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
that corporations—both for-profit and non-profit—are protected by the 
First Amendment: “The Court has recognized that First Amendment 
protection extends to corporations.”11 Specifically, the Court explained 
that corporations have the same speech rights as individuals: “The Court 
has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or 
other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment 
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”12 The 
plaintiffs in the HHS mandate cases in effect contend that the reasoning in 
Citizens United applies with equal force to free exercise rights—that, 
contrary to the government’s claims, the religious exercise of corporations 
should not be treated differently just because corporations are not “natural 
persons” and seek to make profits.13  
This Article contends that the plaintiffs are correct. Although the 
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether for-profit 
corporations have free exercise rights, it has established rules for 
determining whether corporations can invoke particular constitutional 
rights.
14
 Surprisingly, in the cases decided to date, none of the federal 
courts have analyzed these rules in any meaningful way.
15
 In the First 
 
 
 9. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. 
 10. State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. 1985). 
 11. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010). 
 12. Id. at 343 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 13.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The 
government therefore concludes RFRA does not extend to for-profit corporations.”); Korte v. Sebelius, 
735 F.3d 654, 680 (7th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing with the government’s claim “that profit-making is 
incompatible with free-exercise rights”). 
 14. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); Cal. 
Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65–66 (1974). 
 15. This is true of all federal courts that have heard HHS mandate challenges whether deciding 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/5
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Amendment context, though, the Court has emphasized that courts must 
focus on the nature of the constitutional right, not the “person”—whether 
an individual, non-profit, for-profit, or sole-proprietor—who is invoking 
the right. In particular, when determining whether corporations can invoke 
First Amendment protections “[t]he proper question . . . is not whether 
corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are 
coextensive with those of natural persons.”16 Rather, “the question must be 
whether” the religiously motivated activity falls within an area “the First 
Amendment was meant to protect.”17  
In First National Bank v. Bellotti, the Court considered whether a 
statute, which prohibited corporations from spending money to publicize 
their views on a state-law referendum, abridged expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect.
18
 Massachusetts passed legislation 
prohibiting financial institutions from making contributions or 
expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on 
any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting 
any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.”19 The corporate 
plaintiffs sued, seeking the opportunity to express their views on a 
proposed constitutional amendment relating to a graduated income tax. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that corporations, 
as creatures of state law, did not have First Amendment speech rights.
20
 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the lower 
court’s conclusion and reasoning.21 In particular, to determine whether the 
statute impermissibly infringed on the corporation’s speech rights, the 
Court looked at the scope of First Amendment speech protection 
generally, not the state law origin of corporations.
22
 Following Bellotti, 
then, the proper question in the HHS mandate cases is whether the 
contraception coverage mandate of the ACA infringes on religious 
exercise that the First Amendment protects.  
 
 
that corporations could exercise religion or not. For example, in Korte the Seventh Circuit invoked 
Bellotti’s discussion of “purely personal” rights but alleged, “the Court has never elaborated” on that 
standard. Korte, 735 F.3d at 682. 
 16. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 768 n.2 (emphasis omitted) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55 § 8 (West Supp. 
1977)).  
 20. Id. at 771–72. 
 21. Id. at 784.  
 22. Id. at 776–78. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The federal courts that have determined corporations “cannot exercise 
religion”23 typically have made two fundamental errors. First, these courts, 
like the district court in Bellotti, have asked the wrong question—“whether 
and to what extent corporations have First Amendment rights.”24 Instead 
of focusing on whether the Free Exercise Clause covers religious 
objections to the contraception coverage mandate, the Third Circuit and 
the district courts have considered—usually in cursory fashion—only 
whether a for-profit corporation has free exercise rights like those of 
natural persons.
25
  
Second, because these courts asked the wrong question, their analysis 
fails to consider all the relevant Supreme Court case law. In particular, the 
courts rely almost exclusively on an isolated sentence in Wallace v. 
Jaffree
26
 or School District of Abington Township v. Schempp
27
 or a single 
footnote in Bellotti to establish that free exercise is an individual or 
“purely personal” right that does not apply to corporations.28 A more 
detailed review of Bellotti and the Court’s decisions regarding the 
constitutional rights of corporations, however, reveals that free exercise, 
like the freedom of speech, is not a “purely personal” right. Consistent 
with these precedents, several lower courts have recognized that the Free 
 
 
 23. Mersino Mgmt. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-11296, 2013 WL 3546702 at *10 (E.D. Mich. 
July 11, 2013) (“Mersino Management, as a secular for-profit company, cannot ‘exercise’ religion and 
cannot act as the alter ego of its owners in challenging the contraceptive mandate under RFRA.”); 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 917 F. Supp. 
2d 394, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“[W]e agree with Defendants that Conestoga cannot exercise religion 
within the meaning of the RFRA.”); Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 
735, 743 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (“[T]he undersigned district judge views the exercise of religion as a ‘purely 
personal’ guarantee that cannot be extended to corporations.”); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (“The court concludes plaintiffs Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel do not have constitutional free exercise rights as corporations . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 24. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–76. See Conestoga v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382–83 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The threshold question for this Court is whether 
Conestoga, a for-profit, secular corporation, can exercise religion.”); Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 
1287 (“[A] threshold determination [is] whether the particular plaintiffs have constitutional ‘free 
exercise’ rights subject to being violated.”). 
 25. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. 
 26. 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (“As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to 
curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to 
express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.”). See Korte, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 
743–44 (quoting the same sentence from Wallace v. Jaffree). 
 27. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating that the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is “to secure 
religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.”). See 
Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385 (quoting the same sentence from Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp). 
 28. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778–79 n.14 (“Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because 
the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/5
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Exercise Clause applies to both for-profit and non-profit corporations.
29
 
Consequently, when the Supreme Court hears Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties, it should hold, contrary to the Third Circuit, 
that individual business owners and their for-profit corporations have 
standing to raise free exercise and RFRA claims. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE HHS MANDATE 
For many people, the constitutionality of the ACA was resolved in 
2012 when the Supreme Court upheld the “individual mandate” provisions 
of the ACA against commerce, spending, and taxing clause challenges.
30
 
While the Court’s NFIB v. Sebelius decision was one of the most 
anticipated opinions in recent years given the important federalism and 
separation of powers issues involved in that case, it did not end the 
challenges to the ACA. Since its passage, the ACA has spawned more 
than eighteen lawsuits challenging the HHS Mandate in federal courts 
around the country.
31
 These cases challenge the preventive care coverage 
 
 
 29. Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 800 F. Supp. 2d 405, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (permitting an incorporated deli and butcher shop and its owners to assert Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause challenges to a New York labeling law); Women’s Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. 
Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 450 
F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting in the context of a religious corporation that all “corporations 
possess Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection, due process, and, through the doctrine of 
incorporation, the free exercise of religion”) (footnote omitted).  
 30. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (“NFIB”). Congress passed the 
ACA in 2010 to increase the number of Americans covered by insurance and to decrease the cost of 
health care by two main provisions: the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion. The individual 
mandate required most Americans to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage or to 
pay a penalty to the IRS. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). A majority of the Court upheld this provision 
under Congress’s power to tax under Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 
(“The Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not 
obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits 
such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”). The Medicaid 
provisions of the ACA increased the scope of the Medicaid program as well as the number of people 
that states must cover. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012). The court struck down this provision under the 
spending clause. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (striking down the Medicaid provision because “[t]he 
threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State's overall budget, in contrast, is economic dragooning that 
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion”).  
 31. The following is a list of recent cases challenging the HHS mandate in the federal court 
system: Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12–3459–CV–S–RED, 2012 
WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012); Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-02804-DSD-
SER, 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), injunction pending appeal granted, No. 13–1118, 
2013 WL 1276025 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-01096, 2012 WL 
6845677 (W.D. Mich. Dec.. 24, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-2673, 730 F. 3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013); Beckwith 
Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013); 
Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01831 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 2013); Bick Holdings, 
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:13-cv-00462-AGF (E.D. Mo. filed Mar. 13, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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regulations that require most employers with more than fifty employees to 
provide health insurance coverage for all FDA-approved contraception and 
sterilization procedures.
32
 Business owners and their corporations have 
sued to enjoin the HHS mandate, contending that it impermissibly burdens 
their free exercise rights under the First Amendment and RFRA.
33
 In the 
last year, seven circuits—the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, 
 
 
2013); Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 
2:13-cv-11229-DPH-MAR, 2013 WL 1190001 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013), amended by No. 13-11229 
(E.D. Mich. May 21, 2013) (denying preliminary injunction), aff’d, No. 13-1677 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 
2013); Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207-JFC (W.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013) (granting 
preliminary motion); Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying preliminary 
injuction), rev’d sub nom. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-5069, 733 F.3d 
1208 (D.C. Cir.); Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (denying 
preliminary injunction), rev’d sub nom. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting 
motion for an injunction pending appeal); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 
(W.D. Okla. 2012) (denying preliminary injunction), aff’d, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th 
Cir.) (denying injunction pending appeal), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 641 (denying injunction pending appellate 
review), rev’d and remanded, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678; 
Infrastructure Alternatives, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-31 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2013); Korte v. 
Sebelius, 912 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (denying preliminary injunction), rev’d, 735 F.3d 654 
(7th Cir. 2012) (granting injunction pending appeal); Hall v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00295-JRT-LIB (D. 
Minn. Apr. 2, 2013); Hartenbower v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:13-cv-02253 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 18, 2013); Holland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:13-cv-15487 (S.D. W. Va. 
filed June 24, 2013); Johnson Welded Prods., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00609-ESH (D.D.C. May 
24, 2013); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (granting preliminary 
injunction in part, denying in part), rev’d, No. 12-12061, 2013 WL 6768607 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 
2013) (granting preliminary injunction); Lindsay v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-
1210 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2013); Mersino Mgmt. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-11296-PDB-RSW, 2013 
WL 3546702 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2013); MK Chambers Co. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 
13–11379 , 2013 WL 5182435 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013); M&N Plastics, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-
819 (D.D.C.. Nov. 5, 2013) (granting motion to transfer dispute back to E.D. Mich.); Monaghan v. 
Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Mich. 2013), motion for stay granted, No. 12–15488, 2013 WL 
3212597 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2013); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(granting preliminary injunction), aff’d, No. 12-1380, 2013 WL 5481997 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2013); 
O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (granting 
motion to dismiss), motion for stay pending appeal granted, No: 12-3357, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 
26633 (8th Cir.); Ozinga v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:13-cv-03292 (N.D. Ill. July 
16, 2013); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12-cv-00092-DDM (E.D. 
Mo. June 28,, 2013); Sioux Chief Mfg. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 4:13-cv-00036-ODF (W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 
2013); SMA, LLC v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-01375-ADM-LIB (D. Minn. July 8, 2013); The QC Group, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-01726-JRT-SER (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2013); Tonn & Blank Constr., LLC v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-325-JD, 2013 WL 4830952 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013); Trijicon, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-1207-EGS (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2013); Triune Health Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 1:12-cv-06756 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-1478 
(7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2013); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 
2012), appeal dismissed, No. 13-5018, 2013 WL 2395168 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2013); Univ. of Notre 
Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:13-cv-01276-PPS, 2013 WL 6804773 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2013), aff’d, No. 
13–3853, 2014 WL 687134 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014); Willis Law v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01124 
(CKK) (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2013).  
 32. Women's Preventive Servs. Guidelines, supra note 5. 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a) – (b) (Supp. V 1994). 
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and DC Circuits—have heard challenges to the HHS mandate. Given the 
wide range of decisions among the federal district and circuit courts, it is 
not surprising that the United States Supreme Court decided to hear two 
cases that reached opposite conclusions about the constitutionality of the 
HHS mandate.
34
 
The ACA, which President Obama signed into law on March 23, 2010, 
implemented a variety of changes to the healthcare system. Among other 
things, the ACA requires employers to provide certain minimum health 
care coverage, as determined by the federal government.
35
 Many 
employers and religious organizations immediately were concerned about 
the preventive services provision of the ACA, which requires employers to  
at a minimum provide coverage for and . . . not impose any cost 
sharing requirements . . . (4) with respect to women, such additional 
preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in 
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.
36
  
The Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), which is 
part of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), asked the 
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) to draft the HRSA guidelines. The IOM 
subsequently issued its proposed guidelines, requiring that the minimum 
health insurance coverage include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration 
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.”37 
The FDA-approved contraceptive methods include intrauterine devices, 
diaphragms, oral contraceptive pills, and so-called emergency 
contraceptives, such as Plan B and ulipristal (or “Ella”), which are known 
as the morning-after pill and the week-after pill, respectively.
38
  
HRSA adopted IOM’s proposed guidelines on August 1, 2011.39 HHS, 
the Department of Labor, and the Department of Treasury issued rules 
finalizing the HRSA guidelines on February 15, 2012. Pursuant to these 
rules, employers generally are required to have group health plans 
covering the contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures set forth 
in the HRSA guidelines for plan years starting on or after August 1, 
 
 
 34. See Bronner, supra note 3. 
 35. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (Supp. V 2012). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (Supp. IV 2011). 
 37. See Women’s Preventive Servs. Guidelines, supra note 5. 
 38. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 403 (E.D. Pa. 
2013).  
 39. 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2013). 
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2012.
40
 Grandfathered plans, i.e., those that were in existence on March 
23, 2010 and have not undergone any of a defined set of changes,
41
 are not 
required to comply with the HHS mandate.
42
 In addition, “religious 
employers” are exempt.43 The guidelines, however, originally defined 
“religious employer” narrowly to include only those organizations that 
(i) have the primary purpose of inculcating religious values, (ii) primarily 
employ persons who share the organization’s religious beliefs, 
(iii) primarily serve persons who share the organization’s religious tenets, 
and (iv) are non-profits under specific provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code.
44
 Given this definition of “religious employer,” many (and perhaps 
most) religious hospitals, religious schools, and for-profit corporations did 
not qualify as religious employers under the ACA. Responding to the 
outcry of such organizations, the HHS ultimately revised the definition of 
“religious employer” to include “an organization that is organized and 
operated as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) 
or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.”45 The guidelines also exempt 
employers with fewer than fifty employees
46
 and provide a temporary safe 
harbor provision for other non-profit organizations that (i) do not fall 
within any other exemption and (ii) “do not provide some or all of the 
contraceptive coverage otherwise required, consistent with any applicable 
State law, because of the religious beliefs of the organization.”47 
The response to the HHS mandate was immediate. Many individuals, 
religious schools, religious hospitals, and private companies claimed that 
the mandatory coverage provisions violated the Free Exercise Clause and 
RFRA by forcing them to provide coverage for procedures and medicines 
that violated their sincerely held religious beliefs or to pay fines—
amounting to roughly $2,000 per employee per year—for failing to 
provide coverage for contraception and sterilization.
48
 In particular, 
because they believe that some of the FDA-approved contraceptive 
 
 
 40. 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,729 (July 19, 2010). 
 41. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-1251T (2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251 (2013); and 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.140 (2013). 
 42. 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,552 (June 17, 2010). 
 43. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2013). 
 44. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013); 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621-01, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2013). 
 45.  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013). The HHS’s definition of “religious employer” also has been 
challenged in federal courts across the country. See, e.g., The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New 
York v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-02542-BMC, 2013 WL 6579764 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013); Univ. of 
Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:13-cv-01276-PPS (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2013); Belmont Abbey Coll. v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01831 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 2013).  
 46. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 47. 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 16,502–03 (Mar. 21, 2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,728 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
 48. Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (S.D. Ind. 2012). 
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methods act as abortifacients, several religious organizations and business 
owners complained that the HHS mandate infringed on their free exercise 
of religion, forcing them to provide coverage for procedures and drugs that 
are in direct conflict with their religious tenets.
49
 Thus, religious 
employers (such as universities, charities, hospitals, and schools) and 
faithful business owners argued that they would have to either provide 
coverage that violates their faith, confine their services to members of their 
own faith, pay potentially ruinous fines, or cease operations.
50
 
In response, HHS pledged to revisit the scope of the “religious 
employer” exception and to propose modifications that might address 
some of the concerns raised by those opposed to the mandate. On February 
6, 2013, HHS, Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and 
other agencies issued a document proposing amendments to the HHS 
mandate.
51
 Specifically the amendments changed the definition of 
“religious employer,” which in turn, possibly broadened the scope of the 
exemption for religious non-profit organizations that objected to providing 
contraception and sterilization coverage through their group health plans.
52
 
The public comment period on the proposed amendments to the 
contraception coverage mandate closed, and the new rules became 
effective on August 1, 2013.
53
 These new regulations have not resolved the 
prior concerns that religious organizations had because, as the HHS has 
stated, “the simplified and clarified definition of religious employer does 
not expand the universe of religious employers that qualify for the 
exemption beyond that which was intended in the 2012 final 
regulations.”54 Under the new definition, the exemption still is limited to 
“[h]ouses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries.”55 Thus, the criticism 
of the original regulations remains the same: the amendment fails to 
 
 
 49. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(“Because the Greens believe that human life begins at conception, they also believe that they would 
be facilitating harms against human beings if the Hobby Lobby health plan provided coverage for the 
four FDA-approved contraceptive methods that prevent uterine implantation (Ella, Plan B, and the two 
IUDs).”). 
 50. See, e.g., O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 
(E.D. Mo. 2012) (“Plaintiffs state they face a choice between ‘complying with [the ACA’s] 
requirements in violation of their religious beliefs, or paying ruinous fines that would have a crippling 
impact on their ability to survive economically.’”) (alteration in original). 
 51. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
8456-01 (Feb. 6, 2013).  
 52. Id. 
 53. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, published in final form on July 
2, 2013, see 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870. 
 54. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,874 (July 2, 2013). 
 55.  Id. 
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address their concerns because, among other things, the new definition 
still defines religious ministry too narrowly and forces church ministries to 
fund and to make available services, such as abortion-inducing drugs and 
sterilization, that violate the religious tenets of their faiths.
56
 In addition, 
these critics contend that the administration’s proposed revisions fail to 
protect the free exercise rights of business owners and their for-profit 
corporations: 
[T]he HHS mandate creates still a third class, those with no 
conscience protection at all: individuals who, in their daily lives, 
strive constantly to act in accordance with their faith and moral 
values. . . . Friday’s action confirms that HHS has no intention to 
provide any exemption or accommodation at all to this “third class.” 
In obedience to our Judeo-Christian heritage, we have consistently 
taught our people to live their lives during the week to reflect the 
same beliefs that they proclaim on the Sabbath. We cannot now 
abandon them to be forced to violate their morally well-informed 
consciences.
57
 
Thus, given that many of the challenges to the HHS mandate involved for-
profit corporations and the amendments did not exempt those 
corporations, the numerous lawsuits across the country continued, leading 
to conflicting decisions between and among the Third, Sixth, Seventh, 
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. Having granted certiorari in two of these cases, 
the Supreme Court now will have to decide whether, in the wake of 
Citizens United, for-profit corporations have standing to assert free 
exercise and RFRA challenges to the HHS mandate. 
A. Overview of the Free Exercise Issues Implicated by the HHS Mandate 
At first glance, the free exercise challenge to the HHS mandate might 
seem relatively straightforward. First Amendment rights, such as free 
speech and free exercise, are fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. The government can violate such rights only if its reasons for 
 
 
 56. HHS Proposal Falls Short in Meeting Church Concerns: Bishops Look Forward to 
Addressing Issues with Administration, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://usccb.org/news/2013/13-037.cfm. 
 57. Statement of Cardinal Timothy Dolan Responding to Feb. 1 Proposal from HHS, in U.S. 
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 56. 
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doing so meet the highest of judicial standards—strict scrutiny.58 This is 
the standard applied to a variety of free speech claims,
59
 and the same sort 
of protection might naturally be assumed to govern free exercise claims as 
well. In fact, in Sherbert v. Verner
60
 and Thomas v. Review Board of the 
Indiana Employment Security Division
61
 two cases directly addressing the 
free exercise rights of individuals who were denied unemployment 
benefits after refusing work that conflicted with their religious beliefs, the 
Court did just that—applied strict scrutiny to the plaintiffs’ free exercise 
claims. Similarly, if the HHS mandate substantially burdens the free 
exercise rights of individual business owners or their companies, the 
mandate is subject to strict scrutiny. Given that strict scrutiny is frequently 
characterized as being “‘strict’ in theory, but fatal in fact,”62 the HHS 
Mandate is possibly unconstitutional under this high standard of review. 
The analysis is more complicated as a result of the Court’s decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.
63
 In Smith, the plaintiffs were members of 
the Native American Church who ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, 
for sacramental purposes as part of a religious ceremony.
64
 Under Oregon 
law, the possession of peyote and other drugs listed on Schedules I 
through V of the Controlled Substances Act
65
 are “guilty of a Class B 
Felony.”66 The plaintiffs’ employers fired them after learning about their 
 
 
 58. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (noting that if the right to free exercise is 
infringed, the government must show that “any incidental burden . . . may be justified by a ‘compelling 
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate . . . .’”). 
 59. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); 
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 60. 374 U.S. 398. 
 61. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 62. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing “convention ‘strict 
scrutiny’” as “‘strict’ in theory, but fatal in fact”). The Court has made clear that this characterization 
of strict scrutiny is inaccurate as a universal proposition. In certain contexts, such as affirmative action 
in graduate admissions, strict scrutiny is applied with less rigor than when race is used to exclude 
members of a particular race:  
The upshot is that the cases to which the plurality refers, though all applying strict scrutiny, 
do not treat exclusive and inclusive uses the same. Rather, they apply the strict scrutiny test in 
a manner that is “fatal in fact” only to racial classifications that harmfully exclude; they apply 
the test in a manner that is not fatal in fact to racial classifications that seek to include.  
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 833 (2007) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact.’ Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all 
are invalidated by it.”) (citation omitted). 
 63. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–12 (2012). 
 66. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.752(1) (1987). 
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sacramental—and, under Oregon law, illegal—use of peyote. The 
Employment Division denied the plaintiffs’ subsequent request for 
unemployment benefits because they had been fired for “misconduct,” i.e., 
violating Oregon law.
67
 The Oregon Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to unemployment benefits because the Oregon law 
impermissibly infringed on their free exercise rights.
68
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court reasoned, “the right 
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”69 According to the Court, to allow everyone to opt out of 
neutral, generally applicable laws whenever those laws allegedly conflict 
with religious practice “would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit 
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”70 Under such a regime, 
federal laws would become voluntary for religious believers, who could 
exempt themselves from general civic obligations (such as the payment of 
taxes, compulsory military service, health and safety regulations, drug and 
traffic laws, environmental laws, discrimination laws, and a host of other 
obligations) by invoking the Free Exercise Clause.
71
 The Court refused to 
adopt such a far-reaching rule. Although legislation cannot specifically 
target religious conduct (because such laws would not be neutral and 
generally applicable) without satisfying strict scrutiny, merely having 
religious views or practices “which contradict the relevant concerns of a 
political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political 
responsibilities.”72 As a result, the Court upheld Oregon’s denial of 
unemployment benefits because that decision was based on plaintiffs using 
a drug prohibited under a neutral, generally applicable Oregon law.
73
 
 
 
 67. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment)).  
 70. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878), quoted in Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
 71. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889. 
 72. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940). See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 
366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Sunday-closing law against challenges by 
merchants who claimed that such laws burdened their religious practice of closing on Saturday, the 
Sabbath for their particular faiths); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–61 (1982) (requiring an 
Amish employer to pay Social Security taxes despite his claim that the collection and payment of such 
taxes violated his religious exercise). 
 73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (“It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; 
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which 
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After Smith, a claim that a neutral, generally applicable law allegedly 
infringes the Free Exercise Clause is subject only to rational basis 
review.
74
 This low standard, though, directly threatens the free exercise of 
religion. As the President of ACLU, Nadine Strossen, stated during a 
congressional hearing, “[i]n the aftermath of the Smith decision, it was 
easy to imagine how religious practices and institutions would have to 
abandon their beliefs in order to comply with generally applicable, neutral 
laws” and that “such familiar practices as . . . permitting religiously 
sponsored hospitals to decline to provide abortion or contraception 
services” were at risk.75 Thus, in the wake of Smith, the Free Exercise 
Clause does not provide robust protection for religious exercise, which 
may be restricted by neutral, generally applicable laws. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, any heightened protection for free exercise rights must 
be supplied through federal legislation, not the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment. 
In 1993, Congress took action to remove this perceived threat to the 
free exercise of religion. Drawing on broad bipartisan support, Congress 
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) to undo the 
effect of Smith on religious free exercise claims: “[RFRA was meant] to 
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . 
and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases 
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”76 Under RFRA, 
the government can impose substantial burdens on religious exercise 
through a neutral law of general applicability only if the law survives strict 
scrutiny. That is, the government must “demonstrate[] that the application 
of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
 
 
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against 
the centrality of all religious beliefs.”). 
 74. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[A] law that is both neutral and generally applicable need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest to survive a constitutional challenge.”); WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. 
v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529, 541 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . 
confirmed that neutral laws, regulations and policies of general applicability that have only an 
incidental effect on religion need not be held to a standard higher than rational basis scrutiny.”); City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–35 (1997). 
 75. See Kevin C. Walsh, ACLU’s President on Forced Provision of “Contraception Services” 
Over Religious Objections—circa 1992, WALSHLAW (July 13, 2012), http://walshlaw.wordpress.com/ 
2012/07/13/aclus-president-on-forced-provision-of-contraception-services-over-religious-objections-
circa-1992/ (alterations in original)(quoting Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on 
H.R. 2797 Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
102d Cong. 80–81 (1992) (statement of Nadine Strossen, President, ACLU)).  
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1994). 
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governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.”77  
On its face, RFRA applied to federal and state action that substantially 
burdened religious exercise.
78
 But it did not take long for RFRA to be 
challenged in the courts, and in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court 
determined that, as applied to state action, RFRA exceeded Congress’s 
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
79
 In that case, the 
Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a building permit to expand a 
church. The city denied the application because the church was located in 
a recently classified historic district. The Archbishop sued, claiming that 
the ordinance creating the historic district violated RFRA by substantially 
burdening the church’s religious exercise. The Supreme Court held that 
Congress lacked authority to enact RFRA with respect to state action but 
upheld RFRA as to federal legislation.
80
 Consequently, RFRA did not 
constrain the City of Boerne’s ability to deny the building permit.81  
In the wake of Boerne, many states enacted state RFRAs—state 
legislation that mirrored the federal RFRA by providing strict scrutiny 
review for substantial burdens on religious exercise that the State creates.
82
 
As a result, plaintiffs asserting free exercise claims now confront a 
patchwork of different standards depending on whether the claims assert 
Free Exercise Clause, federal RFRA, state RFRA, or state constitution 
challenges.
83
 If a claim is made under the First Amendment that a neutral 
law of general applicability substantially burdens religiously motivated 
conduct, then rational basis applies.
84
 If the same claim is made under a 
 
 
 77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (Supp. V 1994). 
 78. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (“RFRA’s restrictions apply to every agency and official of the 
Federal, State, and local Governments.”). 
 79. Id. at 536. 
 80. Id. at 534–36. See also Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1389, 1412 (2012).  
 81. See id. at 536; see also Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002). 
 82. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. 
L. REV. 466 (2010); W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665 (1999). 
 83. If the law—state or federal—specifically targets a particular religious belief, then the Court 
has indicated that the law is per se unconstitutional. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible 
. . . .”). A law that “infringe[s] upon or restrict[s] practices because of their religious motivation . . . is 
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 84. For a more detailed analysis of the “Free Exercise landscape” post-Smith, see Ronald J. 
Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013).  
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state or federal RFRA, then strict scrutiny applies.
85
 Finally, if a state law 
is alleged to violate religious exercise in a state without a state RFRA, 
then the state constitution determines the level of protection afforded 
religious exercise.
86
 
Against this backdrop, one might wonder whether the free exercise 
claims of the plaintiffs in the HHS mandate cases really matter. If free 
exercise claims receive only rational basis review, then the challengers 
should focus on RFRA, which imposes the higher strict scrutiny standard 
of review. There are at least three reasons why the free exercise challenges 
to the HHS mandate are critically important. First, as discussed above, 
Smith applies only to neutral laws of general applicability.
87
 Given that the 
ACA exempts numerous corporations, grandfathers other health plans, and 
excludes employers with fewer than fifty employees, the HHS mandate 
may not be a neutral, generally applicable law. In that case, the pre-Smith 
standard—i.e., the standard set forth in Sherbert and Yoder—applies. If 
the HHS mandate substantially burdens religious exercise and 
corporations can exercise religion, then the government would have to 
show that the HHS mandate is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest.
88
 But, while the lower courts have acknowledged that individual 
business owners have free exercise rights,
89
 the Supreme Court has not 
considered whether for-profit companies can exercise religion and, 
therefore, invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 
 85. See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda 
with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 598 (1999) (explaining that state RFRAs “facially require 
strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious practices”); Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 
sec. 2(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (Supp. V 1994)) (reinstating the strict scrutiny standard “in 
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”). 
 86. Colombo, supra note 84 at 44 (“[I]f a state law of general applicability ‘substantially 
burden[s]’ a person's religiously motivated conduct in a state that has not adopted . . . its own version 
of RFRA, then the person's ability to challenge such law will be dependent upon the religious liberty 
protections contained in his or her state’s constitution, if any.”). 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
 88. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 671 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining how Smith altered the prior 
standard under Sherbert and Yoder which held that “a substantial burden on religious exercise—even 
one arising from the application of a religion-neutral, generally applicable law—was unconstitutional 
unless the government could show that the burden was the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling public interest”). 
 89. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (E.D. Pa. 
2013) (“[W]e must, as a threshold matter, determine, whether Plaintiffs have ‘free exercise’ rights 
under the First Amendment. The Hahns certainly possess these rights.”); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (“[A] threshold determination [is] whether 
the particular plaintiffs have constitutional ‘free exercise’ rights subject to being violated. As to the 
Greens, the answer to that is obviously yes.”). 
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Second, the free exercise claims of the closely-held companies in 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga are important because they are part of an 
ongoing and hotly contested debate about the scope of corporations’ 
constitutional rights in the wake of the Court’s controversial decision in 
Citizens United. Those challenging the HHS mandate contend that the 
Court’s reasons for extending speech rights to corporations in Citizen 
United compel the same outcome with respect to the Free Exercise Clause. 
In particular, they argue that, under Citizens United and Bellotti, 
corporations, whether non-profit or for-profit, can claim the protection of 
the Free Exercise Clause provided that free exercise is not a “purely 
personal” right. But, so the argument goes, free exercise is not a purely 
personal right. Thus, for-profit corporations can exercise religion. The 
problem for these challengers, though, is that the Third Circuit and several 
district courts have expressly rejected this line of argument, leading to the 
current split among the federal courts. 
Moreover, even if the HHS mandate is neutral and generally 
applicable, establishing that for-profit corporations have free exercise 
rights is important because corporations can then assert a hybrid claim, 
i.e., a claim involving free exercise and some other constitutional claim 
(such as free speech or association). This is important because, as the 
Court noted in Smith, hybrid claims are subject to strict scrutiny: “The 
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars 
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated 
action have involved . . . the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the 
press.”90 Given that corporations are formed by individuals who exercise 
their right of association, corporate religious activity may qualify for strict 
scrutiny review.
91
 This, in turn, would make it much harder for the 
government to limit free exercise rights of for-profit corporations as a 
matter of constitutional law, and not simply legislative grace under RFRA. 
Finally, establishing that the Free Exercise Clause covers for-profit 
corporations demonstrates why corporations fall with RFRA’s ambit as 
well. Even though the free exercise claims of corporations might receive 
only rational basis review under Smith, if for-profit corporations have free 
exercise rights, then any substantial burden on those rights would trigger 
 
 
 90. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
 91. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to 
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected 
from interference by the State [if] a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends 
were not also guaranteed.”). 
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strict scrutiny review under RFRA.
92
 To understand why, one must recall 
that RFRA was meant to restore the pre-Smith strict scrutiny regime for 
federal actions that impose a substantial burden on religious free exercise. 
If for-profit corporations can exercise religion, then, barring any statutory 
language excluding for-profit corporations from RFRA’s coverage, RFRA 
restores heightened review for corporate free exercise claims as well as 
claims by individuals. But given that RFRA does not alter the general 
definition of “person” under the United States Code,93 RFRA requires that 
courts apply strict scrutiny review for substantial burdens on corporate 
free exercise.
94
 
B. The Federal Courts’ Analysis of the Free Exercise Rights of For-Profit 
Corporations 
Given the lack of case law addressing the free exercise rights of for-
profit corporations, the federal courts have reached different conclusions. 
In the various cases that have been decided to date, the federal courts 
generally have taken one of three positions: (1) for-profit corporations do 
not have free exercise rights;
95
 (2) the court need not resolve the question 
because an injunction is not warranted even if for-profit corporations can 
exercise religion;
96
 or (3) for-profit corporations have standing to assert 
free exercise claims on behalf of their owners.
97
 Interestingly, the federal 
 
 
 92. The opposite also is true. If for-profit corporations do not have free exercise rights, then they 
cannot assert a claim under RFRA. See Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 411 (“As we have determined 
that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot exercise religion, . . . Conestoga cannot bring a claim 
under the RFRA.”). 
 93. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person” to include “corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”). 
 94. RFRA defines “religious exercise” broadly (by cross-reference to the definition in the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) to include “any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(7)(A), 2000bb-
2(4) (2000). 
 95. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We are unable to determine that the ‘nature, history, and purpose’ 
of the Free Exercise Clause supports the conclusion that for-profit, secular corporations are protected 
under this particular constitutional provision. Even if we were to disregard the lack of historical 
recognition of the right, we simply cannot understand how a for-profit, secular corporation—apart 
from its owners—can exercise religion.”) (citation omitted); Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
 96. Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (expressing doubt 
that a for-profit corporation could exercise religion but deciding that the court need not “reach the 
issue”); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1158 (E.D. Mo. 
2012); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6845677 at *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012). 
 97. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1150 (10th Cir. 2013); Tyndale House 
Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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district courts generally have not questioned whether non-profit religious 
organizations have free exercise rights: “Courts have found repeatedly that 
religious organizations have free exercise rights.”98 Yet these courts have 
not explained why the two types of corporations—for-profit and non-
profit—should be treated differently for free exercise purposes. The Court 
in Hosanna-Tabor acknowledged that “the text of the First Amendment 
itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”99 
But even assuming that religious organizations get special consideration 
under the Free Exercise Clause, that does not mean secular organizations, 
such as for-profit corporations, are excluded from the protection of the 
Free Exercise Clause. After all, media corporations were thought to get 
“special solicitude” with respect to speech rights, yet, in Citizens United, 
the Court extended speech rights to all corporations.
100
 
Thus, in the absence of precedent directly on point, the lower federal 
courts have understandably struggled when trying to determine how 
Citizens United, Bellotti, and other Supreme Court precedents should 
apply to the HHS mandate. The federal court cases, decided to date, serve 
to (i) illustrate the different ways the courts have tried to reconcile the for-
profit nature of certain corporations with the exercise of religion and 
(ii) provide the foundation for understanding why, under the Court’s 
precedent, all corporations have standing to assert free exercise claims. 
1. The Argument Against Free Exercise Rights for For-Profit 
Corporations: The Third Circuit and the District Courts in Hobby 
Lobby and Korte 
The plaintiffs in the HHS mandate cases—individual business owners 
and their corporations—share the same general claims. The individuals 
seek to exercise their religion through their companies by, among other 
things, adopting policies and health plans that are consistent with their 
religious beliefs. They argue that the HHS mandate forces them to violate 
their sincerely held religious beliefs by requiring them to provide coverage 
 
 
 98. Autocam, 2012 WL 6845677 at *4; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 
1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (“Churches and other religious organizations or religious corporations 
have been accorded protection under the free exercise clause . . . .”). 
 99. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012). 
 100. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (“There is no precedent 
supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as 
media corporations and those which are not. ‘We have consistently rejected the proposition that the 
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.’”) (quoting Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990)). 
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for sterilization procedures, contraceptive drugs that they believe serve as 
abortifacients, and education and counseling related to such contraceptive 
and sterilization methods.
101
 Because these requirements are directly at 
odds with the religious tenets of their faith, the plaintiffs contend that the 
HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise in 
violation of RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. 
Although the plaintiffs’ claims raise a variety of important legal 
issues—whether the HHS mandate is a neutral law of general 
applicability, whether its requirements impose a substantial burden on 
religious exercise, and whether the HHS mandate can survive strict 
scrutiny review under RFRA—a threshold question in each case is 
whether a for-profit corporation has standing to bring a free exercise 
claim. As noted above, this question is entirely novel. When the district 
courts started hearing these cases, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals had analyzed this specific issue: “Plaintiffs have 
not cited, and the court has not found, any case concluding that secular, 
for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby and Mardel have a 
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.”102 The Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits subsequently split on the issue. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court faces a difficult task: against the 
backdrop of conflicting circuit court opinions, and without direct guidance 
from its prior decisions, the Supreme Court must draw upon case law that 
relates to the constitutional rights of corporations more generally in order 
to resolve the tension among the lower courts. 
Given the importance of the question, coupled with the intense reaction 
that Citizens United caused by affirming the free speech rights of for-profit 
corporations, one might expect the lower federal courts to provide a 
detailed analysis of whether for-profit corporations can avail themselves of 
the Free Exercise Clause. To date, none has been forthcoming. The Hobby 
Lobby court issued one of the most detailed district court opinions 
addressing this issue, but its analysis consists of only two paragraphs.
103
 
These two paragraphs have proven to be quite influential, as the Third 
Circuit and several other district courts have cited to the Hobby Lobby 
 
 
 101. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
 102. Id. at 1288. See also Anselmo v. Cnty. Of Shasta, Cal., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1264 (E.D. 
Cal. 2012) (“Although corporations and limited partnerships have broad rights, the court has been 
unable to find a single RLUIPA case protecting the religious exercise rights of a non-religious 
organization such as Seven Hills.”). 
 103. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1287–88. 
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decision.
104
 But none of these courts provide an in-depth explanation as to 
why the for-profit status of a corporation precludes its having standing 
under the Free Exercise Clause. 
The district court in Hobby Lobby starts its analysis by noting “the 
rights of corporate persons and natural persons are not coextensive.”105 
Given the Supreme Court’s prior decisions, this claim is not controversial. 
Corporations have free speech rights
106
 but do not have a “right to exercise 
a privilege against self-incrimination.”107 According to the Hobby Lobby 
court, to determine whether a corporation can claim the protection of a 
constitutional right, courts must decide whether the claimed constitutional 
right is “purely personal.”108 Whether a constitutional right is purely 
personal “depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular 
constitutional provision.”109 Under Bellotti, if “the ‘historic function’ of 
the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals,” 
then for-profit corporations cannot invoke the right.
110
  
Drawing on (1) Bellotti’s focus on the historic function of 
constitutional guarantees and (2) a single sentence in Schempp stating that 
the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause “is to secure religious liberty in 
the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority,”111 
the Hobby Lobby court held that the Free Exercise Clause is a purely 
personal right because “[t]he purpose of the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause is 
‘to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions 
thereof by civil authority.’”112 The personal nature of the right, however, 
did not preclude the Court from extending free exercise protection to 
religious non-profit corporations, such as churches and religious 
organizations. Religions non-profits can claim the protection of the Free 
Exercise Clause “because believers ‘exercise their religion through 
 
 
 104. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2013); Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 
2d 735, 743 (S.D. Ill. 2012), Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408 
(E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 105. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
 106. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (“Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech 
does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’”) (quoting First 
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 107. Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the SEC v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 
413, 416 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996), quoted in Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
 108. Hobby Lobby 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778–79 n.14 (citing from U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701 (1944)).  
 111. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
 112. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (emphasis in original) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 
223).  
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religious organizations.’”113 Given that (i) free exercise is a purely 
personal right and (ii) for-profit corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, are 
not “religious” organizations, the court concluded that for-profit 
corporations “do not have constitutional free exercise rights . . . and that 
they therefore cannot show a likelihood of success as to any constitutional 
claims they may assert.”114 
In Korte, the district court for the Southern District of Illinois followed 
the reasoning in Hobby Lobby, holding that “the exercise of religion [is] a 
‘purely personal’ guarantee that cannot be extended to corporations.”115 
The Korte court recognized Bellotti’s admonition that whether a 
constitutional right is purely personal “depends on the nature, history, and 
purpose of the particular constitutional provision,”116 but instead of 
exploring that history, the court relied on one sentence from Wallace v. 
Jaffree
117
 and part of a dissent from Justice Souter in Hein v. Freedom 
from Religion Foundation, Inc.
118
 Based on these authorities, the district 
court concluded that “a corporation may be able to advance a belief 
system, but it cannot exercise religion.”119 Thus, the for-profit corporate 
plaintiff lacked standing to assert a free exercise or RFRA claim. 
In Conestoga, the Third Circuit considered two arguments offered in 
support of for-profit corporations having free exercise rights: the Citizens 
United theory (under which corporations can exercise religion as well as 
 
 
 113. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
 116. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–79 n.14 (1978). 
 117. The district court in Korte quotes Wallace v. Jaffree to support its view that the free exercise 
is a purely personal—i.e., individual—right. Korte, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 743. In particular, the district 
court invokes Wallace for the proposition that “[a]s is plain from its text, the First Amendment was 
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to 
worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.” Id. at 743–744 
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985)). 
 118. See id. at 743. (quoting Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 638 
(2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting James Madison for the proposition that “[t]he Religion . . . of 
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man 
to exercise it as these may dictate”) (alteration in original)). 
 119.  Id. at 744. The district court in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 
2d 394 (E.D. Pa. 2013) reached the same conclusion as the Hobby Lobby and Korte courts. The 
Conestoga court took “the distinction between religious organizations and secular corporations to be 
meaningful, and decline[d] to act as though this difference did not exist.” Id. at 407. In the court’s 
view, the Free Exercise Clause was meant to protect individual free exercise: “Religious belief takes 
shape within the minds and hearts of individuals, and its protection is one of the more uniquely 
‘human’ rights provided by the Constitution.” Id. at 408. Thus, a for-profit corporation—a non-human 
plaintiff—could not avail itself of the Free Exercise Clause. 
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speech)
120
 and the “passed through” method (which permits corporations 
to assert the free exercise rights of their owners).
121
 A split panel of the 
Third Circuit rejected both arguments. Specifically, with respect to 
extending Citizens United to the free exercise context, the majority noted 
that this was “a question of first impression.”122 To resolve this novel 
question, the court invoked Bellotti, which acknowledged that 
corporations may assert a variety of constitutional rights but not rights that 
are “purely personal.” To make this determination, the court looked at “the 
nature, history, and purpose of the” Free Exercise Clause.123 
Whereas in Citizens United the Supreme Court found “a long history of 
protecting corporations’ rights to free speech,”124 the Third Circuit 
majority found no “similar history of courts providing free exercise 
protection to corporations.”125 In fact, drawing on Schempp and the district 
court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby, the court concluded that free exercise is a 
“purely personal” right such that no entity “created to make money could 
exercise such an inherently ‘human’ right.”126 Although the Supreme 
Court previously recognized that religious non-profit corporations could 
exercise religion, there was no history of courts upholding the free 
exercise rights of for-profit corporations.
127
 Consequently, the majority 
rejected Conestoga’s free exercise claim. 
Similarly, the Third Circuit declined to follow the “passed through” 
theory of corporate free exercise
128
 that the Ninth Circuit developed in 
Townley
129
 and Stormans.
130
 In these cases, the Ninth Circuit allowed for-
profit corporations to assert the free exercise claims of their owners. Given 
the close relationship between the owners and the company, the religious 
beliefs of the former passed through and were a part of the latter: “[the 
 
 
 120. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 383–84. 
 124. Id. at 384. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 385. See also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012) (“General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief 
systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe 
sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and 
direction of their individual actors.”), cited in Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385. 
 127. See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385 (“We will not draw the conclusion that, just because courts 
have recognized the free exercise rights of churches and other religious entities, it necessarily follow 
that for-profit, secular corporations can exercise religion.”). 
 128. Id. at 386–87. 
 129. EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 130. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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pharmacy was] an extension of the beliefs of members of the Stormans 
family, and that the beliefs of the Stormans family are the beliefs of [the 
pharmacy].”131 The Conestoga majority rejected this approach because, in 
its view, the “passed through” theory embodied “erroneous assumptions 
regarding the very nature of the corporate form.”132 In particular, under 
general principles of corporate law, corporations have a separate and 
distinct legal existence from their owners.
133
 In exchange for the benefits 
of incorporation, such as limited liability, corporations and owners have 
different rights and responsibilities as evidenced by the HHS Mandate. 
According to the Third Circuit, the HHS Mandate operates only on 
Conestoga and not on its owners, the Hahns.
134
 The corporation, not the 
owners, must comply with and pay for the HHS Mandate. Any injury, 
therefore, affects Conestoga and not the Hahns. Moreover, given that the 
company has its own separate existence, the Hahns’ religious beliefs 
should not and cannot be imputed—or “passed through”—to the 
company.
135
 And, given that Citizens United does not extend free exercise 
rights to for-profit corporations, there is no basis for allowing Conestoga 
to assert claims for violations of the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.
136
 
2. Judicial Agnosticism Regarding the Free Exercise Rights of For-
Profit Corporations: Grote Industries and O’Brien 
Whereas Hobby Lobby and Korte acknowledged the novelty of the free 
exercise claims involved in the HHS mandate cases and decided that the 
for-profit corporate plaintiffs lacked standing, other district courts have 
declined to resolve the threshold issue. For example, in Grote Industries, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, the district court for the Southern District of Indiana 
expressed doubt that a for-profit corporation could exercise religion, citing 
Hobby Lobby.
137
 But the court ultimately determined that it need not 
“reach the issue of whether a secular, for-profit corporation is capable of 
exercising a religion within the meaning of RFRA or the First 
 
 
 131. Id. at 1120. 
 132. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 387. 
 133. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (noting that 
“incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, 
and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created” the corporation). 
 134. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 388 (“Since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns, the Mandate does 
not actually require the Hahns to do anything.”). 
 135. Id. at 388. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Grote Indus., Inc. v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (citing Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288, 1291–92 (W.D. Okla. 2012)). 
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Amendment.”138 Because the district court determined that the HHS 
mandate did not impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of 
the individual owners or their company, whether for-profit corporations 
could invoke the protection of RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause was 
irrelevant. Thus, the district court did not address whether Grote 
Industries, a closely-held, for-profit corporation, could exercise religion 
within the meaning of RFRA or the First Amendment.
139
  
The district courts in O’Brien v. United States Department of Health 
and Human Services
140
 and Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius
141
 avoided the 
threshold determination in the same way. Because these courts held that 
the HHS mandate did “not impose a ‘substantial burden’ on either” the 
individual owners or their companies, the courts “decline[d] to reach the 
question of whether a secular limited liability company is capable of 
exercising a religion within the meaning of RFRA or the First 
Amendment.”142 Accordingly, the courts denied the requests for injunctive 
relief without addressing the threshold question relating to the free 
exercise rights of for-profit corporations. 
3. The Argument That For-Profit Corporations Have Standing to 
Assert Free Exercise Claims: The Tenth Circuit and Tyndale House 
Publishers 
Prior to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hobby Lobby, none of the 
federal courts considering challenges to the HHS mandate expressly held 
that the Free Exercise Clause protects for-profit corporations as well as 
non-profit religious corporations.
143
 The closest any of the federal district 
courts has come is to hold that for-profit corporations have third-party 
standing based on the free exercise rights of their owners. The district 
court in Tyndale House Publishers held that the corporate plaintiff, a 
Christian publishing company, had standing to assert the free exercise 
 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. A closely-held corporation is a corporation in which all of the shares are owned by only a 
few shareholders. A closely-held corporation is private such that its shares are not publicly traded. 
Frequently some or all of the shareholders in a closely-held corporation also are involved in the 
management of the business, e.g., in a closely held corporation that is family owned and operated. 
 140. 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012). 
 141. 2012 WL 6845677 (W.D. Mich. 2012). 
 142. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1158; see also Autocam, 2012 WL 6845677 at *4. 
 143. See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(“This Court, like others before it, declines to address the unresolved question of whether for-profit 
corporations can exercise religion within the meaning of the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
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rights of its owners,
144
 drawing on the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in 
Townley and Stormans.
145
 Although Tyndale’s corporate structure was 
complex, with four entities owning varying amounts of Tyndale’s voting 
and non-voting shares, the court determined that “the beliefs of Tyndale 
and its owners are indistinguishable.”146 Tyndale shared a common 
Christian faith with the four entities that owned its shares, and each entity 
“play[ed] a distinct role in achieving shared, religious objectives.”147 
Given the shared religious mission among the Tyndale entities and the fact 
that the primary owner was a non-profit religious organization that could 
exercise religion in its own right, “courts must ‘consider the rights of the 
owners as the basis for the [f]ree [e]xercise claim’ brought by the 
corporation, even if the regulation technically applies only to the 
corporation.”148 Thus, Tyndale had standing to assert its owners’ religious 
objections to providing the insurance coverage required by the HHS 
mandate. 
The Tyndale court limited its holding to closely-held corporations that 
implement the religious beliefs of its owners: “But Townley and Stormans 
are far more limited than the defendants indicate—the cases only permit a 
corporation to assert the free exercise rights of its owners when it is 
closely-held and the beliefs of the corporation are an extension of the 
owners’ beliefs.”149 As a result, even under Tyndale, corporate free 
exercise is curtailed significantly. Any right of a corporation to assert a 
free exercise claim (i) is limited to closely-held corporations that are used 
as an extension of the owners’ beliefs and (ii) derives from the First 
 
 
 144. Id. at 117. 
 145. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding “that a 
corporation has standing to assert the free exercise right of its owners”); EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & 
Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Townley present[ed] no rights of its own different from 
or greater than its owners’ rights.”). 
 146. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 116. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 117 (alteration in original) (quoting Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1120–22). District courts in 
other circuits have disagreed with the Tyndale court. Focusing on the distinct legal status of a 
corporations, the Conestoga court held that  
[i]t would be entirely inconsistent to allow the Hahns to enjoy the benefits of incorporation, 
while simultaneously piercing the corporate veil for the limited purpose of challenging these 
regulations. We agree with the Autocam court, which stated that this separation between a 
corporation and its owners ‘at a minimum [] means the corporation is not the alter ego of its 
owners for purposes of religious belief and exercise.’  
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d. 394, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting 
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6845677, at *7 (W.D. Mich. 2012). 
 149. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 117 n.11. 
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Amendment rights of the owners, not an independent right of the 
organization itself. 
In Hobby Lobby, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, became the first 
circuit court to hold that for-profit, secular corporations can exercise 
religion under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.
150
 With respect to 
RFRA, the Tenth Circuit started with RFRA’s directive that the 
“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion.”151 Under the Dictionary Act, “person” is defined broadly to 
include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, 
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals” unless the 
context indicates that a narrower definition is warranted.
152
 Neither other 
federal statutes nor prior Supreme Court case law provided any indication 
that “person” should exclude for-profit corporations under RFRA. Rather, 
the fact that the Supreme Court has confirmed that certain corporate 
claimants—namely, religious non-profits—fall within RFRA153 indicated 
to the Tenth Circuit that Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and other for-profit 
corporations that exercise religion could assert claims under RFRA.
154
 
Furthermore, the Hobby Lobby majority rejected the non-profit/for-
profit distinction that played such an important role in the Third Circuit’s 
analysis.
155
 Because the Supreme Court expressly has held that individuals 
may come together in groups, associations, and even corporations to 
advance First Amendment rights,
156
 the Tenth Circuit concluded that free 
exercise cannot be a purely personal right.
157
 Given that the First 
Amendment protects the exercise of religion, “the protections of the 
Religion Clauses extend beyond the walls of a church, synagogue, or 
mosque to religiously motivated conduct, as well as religious belief.”158 As 
Citizens United confirmed, conduct—including speech activity—can 
occur by and through for-profit corporations.
159
 The Tenth Circuit, 
 
 
 150. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1150 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 151. Id. at 1128; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (Supp. V 1994). 
 152. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), cited in Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129–30. 
 153. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 973 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Affirming a RFRA claim brought by “a New Mexico corporation on its own 
behalf”), aff’d, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 154. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129 (citing O Centro Espirita, 389 F. 3d at 973). 
 155. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1131. 
 156. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to 
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected 
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends 
were not also guaranteed.”) (emphasis added). 
 157. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133–34. 
 158. Id. at 1134. 
 159. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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therefore, determined that there was “no reason the Supreme Court would 
recognize constitutional protection for a corporation’s political expression 
but not its religious expression.”160 As a result, the court concluded that 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel were “persons” under RFRA and, given their 
overtly religious missions,
161
 could exercise religion.
162
 
As the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Hobby Lobby suggests, the Tyndale 
court, the Third Circuit, and all of the other district courts that have 
analyzed the threshold question of whether for-profit corporations can 
exercise religion are wrong.
163
 As discussed below, for-profit corporations 
can exercise religion and their religious activities are protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause and RFRA. That is, they have standing in their own right 
under RFRA and the First Amendment without reference to “passed 
through” standing. For-profit corporations, like their non-profit 
counterparts, advance beliefs on a wide range of topics—from religion to 
ethics to the environment and everything in between. For-profits also take 
corporate actions to support their preferred causes and, under the HHS 
mandate, are the “persons” responsible for providing the contraception and 
sterilization coverage that conflicts with the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. 
Just as an individual exercises her religion when she refuses to work on 
the Sabbath day of her faith or to use FDA-approved contraceptive 
methods, for-profit corporations exercise religion when they refuse to 
open on the Sabbath and object to the HHS mandate on religious grounds. 
And, as it turns out, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Bellotti, 
Citizens United, and White confirm this understanding of the Free Exercise 
Clause and RFRA.  
 
 
 160. Hobby Lobby, 723 F. 3d at 1135. 
 161.  Id. at 1137 (“The Greens, moreover, have associated through Hobby Lobby and Mardel with 
the intent to provide goods and services while adhering to Christian standards as they see them, and 
they have made business decisions according to those standards. And the Greens are unanimous in 
their belief that the contraceptive-coverage requirement violates the religious values they attempt to 
follow in operating Hobby Lobby and Mardel.”). 
 162. Id. at 1135. 
 163. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012), may be the one exception to this 
categorical statement. The Newland court apparently assumes that for-profit corporations are protected 
under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, but the court does not explain why. Rather, the court 
asserts that “[t]hese arguments [regarding the free exercise rights of corporations] pose difficult 
questions of first impression” and that they “merit more deliberate investigation,” but the court does 
not investigate. Id. at 1296. Instead of analyzing the nature, purpose, and history of the Free Exercise 
Clause, the court simply considers the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, ultimately granting the requested 
injunction. Id. at 1299.  
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II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE PROTECTS FOR-PROFIT AND NON-PROFIT 
CORPORATIONS ALIKE BECAUSE, AS BELLOTTI AND WHITE 
DEMONSTRATE, THE RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE IS NOT A “PURELY 
PERSONAL” RIGHT BUT “SERVES SIGNIFICANT SOCIETAL INTERESTS” 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”164 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to 
protect the right to, among other things, believe and propound one’s 
religious beliefs, whatever they might be.
165
 Consequently, the First 
Amendment prohibits “governmental regulation of religious beliefs as 
such.”166 The government therefore is precluded from compelling 
affirmation of particular religious beliefs,
167
 punishing the promulgation of 
religious beliefs that the government takes to be false,
168
 discriminating 
against religious believers based on their religious beliefs or status as a 
religious person,
169
 and weighing in on one side of a dispute over religious 
dogma or authority.
170
  
As its name suggests, though, the Free Exercise Clause protects more 
than religious belief and expression: “[The First] Amendment embraces 
two concepts[]—[the] freedom to believe and freedom to act.”171 As its 
name suggests, the free exercise clause is more expansive than the merely 
private “worship” or “freedom of conscience” language that Madison had 
originally proposed when drafting early versions of the First 
Amendment.
172
 “Exercise” includes not only paradigmatic religious 
 
 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.  
 165. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The free 
exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious 
doctrine one desires.”). 
 166. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). 
 167. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492–93 (1961). 
 168. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944). 
 169. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The Establishment 
Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by 
virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique 
disabilities.”); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953). 
 170. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 445 (1969); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 
708–25 (1976). 
 171. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 172. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488 (1990) (noting that “the term ‘free exercise’ makes clear that 
the clause protects religiously motivated conduct as well as belief”). The free exercise of religion was 
understood to extend beyond worship or individual conscience to all religiously motivated conduct that 
was required by one’s conscience or religious convictions. See id. at 1489–90. 
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activity, such as worshipping, celebrating sacraments, proselytizing, and 
observing dietary or dress requirements,
173
 but also declining to work on 
Saturday
174
 and refusing to help build materials for war.
175
 Similarly, as 
the federal courts have unanimously held in the HHS mandate cases, free 
exercise permits individuals and religious non-profits to refuse to provide 
coverage for certain types of contraception and sterilization procedures.
176
 
Under Bellotti, though, this is only a minimum. The First Amendment 
protects religious exercise generally; it is not limited to a privileged class 
of individual “persons” who seek to act on their religious beliefs—and for 
good reason.
177
 For many believers, religious practice cannot be restricted 
to the private expression of religion in one’s home or place of worship. 
Their faith permeates all aspects of their lives, leading them to form 
groups and associations that embody and promote the values that are 
central to their faith.
178
 The Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged 
this “right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities 
protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the 
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution 
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means 
of preserving other individual liberties.”179  
Not surprisingly, then, the First Amendment limits the government’s 
ability to interfere with any and all forms of religious exercise and speech. 
 
 
 173. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).  
 174. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–06 (1963). The Court in Sherbert noted, “to condition 
the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her 
religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.” Id. at 406. 
 175. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713–16 (1981).  
 176. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (“The 
question of whether plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their constitutional claims requires a threshold 
determination of whether the particular plaintiffs have constitutional ‘free exercise’ rights subject to 
being violated. As to the Greens, the answer to that is obviously yes.”); Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (holding that “[t]he Hahns certainly 
possess these [free exercise] rights”); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 
117 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Nor is there any dispute that Tyndale’s primary owner, the Foundation, can 
‘exercise religion’ in its own right, given that it is a non-profit religious organization; indeed, the case 
law is replete with examples of such organizations asserting cognizable free exercise and RFRA 
challenges.”). 
 177. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).  
 178. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) (“A 
religious individual may enter the for-profit realm intending to demonstrate to the marketplace that a 
corporation can succeed financially while adhering to religious values.”). 
 179. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
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It does not restrict these fundamental constitutional protections to natural 
persons in their individual speech activity or exercise of religion:  
The First Amendment does not say that only one kind of 
corporation enjoys this right [to exercise religion]. The First 
Amendment does not say that only religious corporations or only 
not-for-profit corporations are protected. The First Amendment 
does not authorize Congress to pick and choose the persons or the 
entities or the organizational forms that are free to exercise their 
religion.
180
 
That the First Amendment protects speech and the free exercise of 
religion regardless of who is invoking that protection is apparent from 
Bellotti. Instead of focusing on “whether corporations ‘have’ First 
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of 
natural persons,” Bellotti instructs that “the question must be whether” the 
religiously motivated activity falls within an area “the First Amendment 
was meant to protect.”181 That is, the operative question under the First 
Amendment is what is being done—whether there is an infringement on 
speech or the exercise of religion—not on who is speaking or exercising 
religion: “First Amendment protection extends to corporations . . . [, and 
the Court] has thus rejected the argument that . . . corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment 
simply because such associations are not natural persons.”182 Hence, the 
Bellotti Court emphasized that “[i]f the speakers here were not 
corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their 
proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking 
in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a 
corporation rather than an individual.”183  
Consistent with Bellotti, the Court has recognized that a non-profit 
corporation can invoke the Free Exercise Clause, even when it is not a 
pervasively “religious organization” such as a church.184 In Bob Jones 
 
 
 180. EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting). 
 181. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at, 776.  
 182. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 183. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (footnote omitted). 
 184. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Accordingly, we take it as both 
conceded and controversial that the use of the corporate form and the associated legal attributes of that 
status—think separate legal personhood, limitations on owners’ liability, special tax treatment—do not 
disable an organization from engaging in the exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA (or the 
Free Exercise Clause, for that matter).”). 
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University v. United States, the Court held that two religious schools, 
which were not “churches or other purely religious institutions,”185 could 
assert free exercise claims on behalf of the corporations, not merely on 
behalf of the individuals who comprised them.
186
 The Court permitted the 
schools to pursue their claim that the IRS violated the Free Exercise 
Clause by rescinding their tax-exempt status as a result of allegedly 
discriminatory admissions policies. Similarly, last term in Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., the Court 
acknowledged that another religious organization, this time a church and 
school, could invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.
187
 
Although the Court noted that “the text of the First Amendment itself . . . 
gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations[,]”188 it did 
not limit the Free Exercise Clause to such religious organizations or 
distinguish its prior holding in Bob Jones University. Rather, the Court 
focused on the only issue before it: whether a religious organization has 
the “freedom to select its own ministers.”189 The Court held that it did.190 
Moreover, because the First Amendment protects speech and religious 
activity generally, having a profit-seeking motive is not sufficient to defeat 
a business’s speech or free exercise claim.191 On two separate occasions, 
 
 
 185. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983). 
 186. As the Court noted, Bob Jones University is not a church or specific religious institution; 
rather, it is a 
nonprofit corporation located in Greenville, S.C.. Its purpose is ‘to conduct an institution of 
learning . . ., giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the 
Holy Scriptures.’. . . Bob Jones University is not affiliated with any religious denomination, 
but is dedicated to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious 
beliefs. It is both a religious and educational institution. 
Id. at 579–80 (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted). Similarly, the other plaintiff in Bob Jones 
University,  
was established ‘to conduct an institution of learning . . ., giving special emphasis to the 
Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures.’ The school offers classes 
from kindergarten through high school, and since at least 1969 has satisfied the State of North 
Carolina’s requirements for secular education in private schools.  
Id. at 583 (citation omitted).  
 187. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012) 
(noting that, although there can be internal tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses, it was “[n]ot so here [because b]oth Religion clauses bar the government from interfering 
with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers”).  
 188. Id. at 706. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. In several of the HHS mandate cases, the government relied on a summary statement in 
United States v. Lee to support its claim that for-profit activity prohibits corporations from invoking 
free exercise rights: “When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be 
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.” 455 U.S. 252, 
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the Court has upheld the right of sole proprietorships, which are profit-
seeking enterprises, to invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. 
In United States v. Lee, the Court held that an Amish business owner, who 
ran a farm and carpentry shop, could raise a free exercise defense to his 
alleged failure to pay social security taxes for his employees.
192
 Because 
the Old Order Amish “believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly 
and needy,”193 the employer “object[ed] on religious grounds to receipt of 
public insurance benefits and to payment of taxes to support public 
insurance funds.”194 Likewise, in Braunfeld v. Brown, “merchants” in 
Philadelphia challenged the city’s Sunday-closing laws because the laws 
allegedly infringed on their free exercise of religion.
195
 The merchants 
were Orthodox Jews who observed the Sabbath on Saturday. As a result of 
the Sunday-closing laws and their faith, the merchants could not open their 
stores on the weekends.
196
 Given their desire to live out their religious 
beliefs in their businesses, they argued that the law violated the Free 
Exercise Clause because it “impair[ed] the ability of all appellants to earn 
a livelihood.”197 In addressing their claims on the merits, the Court 
acknowledged that the profit motive of the plaintiffs did not subvert their 
right to bring a free exercise claim.
198
  
 
 
261 (1982). If correct, the government’s interpretation would prevent any profit-making enterprises 
from claiming the protection of the Free Exercise Clause because their conduct relates to commercial 
activity. But such a narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is inconsistent with Lee, in 
which the Court reached the merits of the Amish farmer’s free exercise claim. At most, this passage 
may presage the Court’s decision in Smith, but it does not exclude profit-making businesses from the 
protection of the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 680–81 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
 192. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).  
 193. Id. at 255.  
 194. Id. at 254. Having determined that the Amish employer could invoke the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Court applied strict scrutiny, protecting the religious duty unless the government could 
show that the statute “is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.” Id. at 257–58. In 
Lee, the Court found that the government carried its burden in relation to the social security system 
and that, under such circumstances, “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial 
activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and 
faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.” 
Id. at 261. Accordingly, Lee indicates that profit-seeking businesses can claim the protection of the 
Free Exercise Clause but that the government still can interfere with the religious exercise when it 
satisfies strict scrutiny. 
 195. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 196. Id. at 601. 
 197. Id.  
 198. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 680 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f profit-making alone was 
enough to disqualify the merchants [in Braunfeld] from bringing the claim, the Court surely would 
have said so. It did not. Instead, the Court addressed and rejected their free-exercise claim on the 
merits.”). 
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As discussed in the following subsections, taken together these cases 
highlight three reasons why the Third Circuit and the federal district courts 
erred in holding that corporations cannot invoke the protection of the Free 
Exercise Clause: (i) the Free Exercise Clause is not a “purely personal” 
right; (ii) just as freedom of speech is not limited to corporations in the 
“speech business,” free exercise applies to for-profit corporations as well 
as non-profits in the “religion business;” and (iii) limiting free exercise to 
non-profit religious organizations discriminates against religious groups 
and individuals who seek to live their faith through their for-profit 
corporations.  
A. Because, as the Supreme Court Previously Acknowledged, Non-Profit 
Corporations Can Exercise Religion, the Free Exercise Clause Is Not a 
“Purely Personal” Right That Applies “Only to Natural Individuals” 
Following the district court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius,
199
 several federal courts have held that “the exercise of religion 
[is] a ‘purely personal’ guarantee that cannot be extended to 
corporations.”200 Drawing on a footnote in Bellotti,201 these courts note 
that the Supreme Court has refused to extend certain constitutional rights, 
such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to privacy, to 
corporations.
202
 They also recognize that under Bellotti whether a 
constitutional provision is purely personal “depends on the nature, history, 
and purpose of the particular provision.”203 But, instead of analyzing the 
cases that discuss “purely personal” rights or evaluating “the nature, 
history, and purpose” of the Free Exercise Clause, several of these courts 
rely on isolated sentences in Wallace v. Jaffree
204
 and Schempp
205
 to 
 
 
 199. 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
 200. Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
See also Conestoga v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“We do not see how a for-profit ‘artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law,’ that was created to make money could exercise such an inherently ‘human’ 
right.”) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y, Inc. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 346 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 201. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–79 n.14 (1978). 
 202. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 383 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778–79 n.14). 
 203. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778–79 n.14. See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385 (citing Bellotti); Korte, 
912 F. Supp. 2d at 743 (citing Bellotti). 
 204.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (“The First Amendment was adopted to curtail the 
power of Congress to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express 
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.”) (emphasis added). 
 205. Sch. Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating that the 
purpose of the Free Exercise Clause “is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any 
invasions thereof by civil authority”). 
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support their conclusion that for-profit corporations cannot exercise 
religion: “[The purpose of the free exercise clause] is to secure religious 
liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil 
authority.”206 Presumably, because these district courts view free exercise 
as an individual right, they conclude that “a corporation may be able to 
advance a belief system, but it cannot exercise religion.”207  
Conestoga is a notable exception. Although the Third Circuit relies 
heavily on the “purely personal” language in Bellotti and Schempp, it 
actually considers the history of the Free Exercise Clause concluding that, 
unlike the free speech context where Citizens United invoked a litany of 
cases protecting corporate free speech, there is not “any case preceding the 
commencement of litigation about the Mandate, in which a for-profit, 
secular corporation was itself found to have free exercise rights.”208 The 
lack of a specific history of corporate free exercise is not surprising given 
the novelty of the free exercise claims raised in the HHS mandate cases. 
But the Third Circuit’s predicating free exercise protection on such a 
history ignores the interpretive method set out in Bellotti, which focuses 
on the nature of the religious exercise, not whether corporations “have” 
specific constitutional rights. Thus, the relevant history under the Bellotti 
framework relates to the protection afforded religious objectors to laws 
that conflict with religious tenets. As Sherbert, Thomas, Lee, Braunfeld, 
Lukumi, and Hosanna-Tabor demonstrate, the Free Exercise Clause does 
protect religious objections to laws that conflict with a plaintiff’s sincerely 
held religious beliefs—regardless of who (individual or corporation) is 
asserting the claim. 
The Third Circuit’s analysis, therefore, is flawed for at least two 
reasons. First, recognizing that a right is personal does not preclude 
extending the right to corporations. For example, the Supreme Court 
previously described free speech as an individual right:  
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech 
and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal 
 
 
 206. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Schempp). 
 207. Korte, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
 208. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 384; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 
394, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (noting that there is “no such historical support for the proposition that a 
secular, for-profit corporation possesses the right to free exercise of religion”). 
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rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
209
  
The fact that free speech is a “fundamental personal” right, however, 
did not stop the Court from extending free speech rights to corporations. 
As the Court confirmed in Citizens United, “First Amendment protection 
extends to corporations. . . . The Court has thus rejected the argument that 
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations 
are not ‘natural persons.’”210 Similarly, even if the Free Exercise Clause 
protects “the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express 
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience,”211 
individuals can avail themselves of the corporate form, and the resulting 
corporation can engage in the exercise of religion. The Court suggested as 
much in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, where the Court explained that 
“an expressive association” is a group of individuals coming together “for 
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and 
the exercise of religion.”212 This is why, as all the federal courts have 
acknowledged, the Free Exercise Clause protects an “individual’s freedom 
to believe” as well as a non-profit corporation’s exercise of religion.213 But 
if non-natural persons (religious non-profit corporations) can exercise 
religion, Bellotti’s reasoning instructs that for-profit corporations can also 
 
 
 209. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
95 (1940) (“The freedom of speech . . . which [is] secured by the First Amendment against abridgment 
by the United States, [is] among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all 
persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15, 24 (1971) (explaining that the free speech clause “is designed and intended to remove 
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall 
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system 
rests”). 
 210. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). 
 211. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). 
 212. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (emphasis added).  
 213. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1993) 
(upholding the Free Exercise claim of a “not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law”); 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1134 (10th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that 
“individuals may incorporate for religious purposes and keep their Free Exercise rights”); Conestoga, 
724 F.3d at 385 (“We will not draw the conclusion that, just because courts have recognized the free 
exercise rights of churches and other religious entities, it necessarily follows that for-profit, secular 
corporations can exercise religion.”). 
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exercise religion.
214
 Not all corporations will engage in religious conduct, 
but, given that the Free Exercise Clause protects conduct whether 
exercised by natural persons or corporations, they can. 
The second, and more important, flaw with the Third Circuit’s analysis 
is that it and the federal district courts have ignored the Supreme Court’s 
discussion of “purely personal” rights in White215 and Schultz,216 which 
demonstrate why free exercise is not a purely individual right. Most of the 
federal courts denying that for-profit corporations have free exercise rights 
invoke footnote fourteen in Bellotti for the proposition that “[c]ertain 
‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination are unavailable to corporations and other organizations 
because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited 
to the protection of individuals.”217 To determine “[w]hether or not a 
particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations 
for some other reason [one must look at] the nature, history, and purpose 
of the particular provision.”218  
Although Bellotti did not explain why self-incrimination is a purely 
personal right that is unavailable to corporations, it cited White, which 
does provide a detailed discussion of what makes a right purely 
personal.
219
 In White, the district court subpoenaed documents from a 
union as part of a grand jury investigation into alleged irregularities in the 
construction of a Navy supply depot.
220
 An assistant supervisor of the 
union refused to produce the documents, invoking the right against self-
incrimination because the documents might incriminate the union or the 
assistant supervisor, in his official or individual capacity.
221
 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court rejected the assistant supervisor’s claim, holding that 
 
 
 214. In Bellotti, the Court expressly rejected the claim that only corporations in the “speech” or 
communication business (e.g., media companies) had broad free speech rights. 435 U.S. at 781. The 
Court also acknowledged that “[f]reedom of speech and the other freedoms encompassed by the First 
Amendment always have been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the 
Due Process Clause.” Id. at 780. Given that free exercise is a fundamental right that some corporations 
may claim, Bellotti indicates that there is no reason for limiting that right to corporations in the 
“religion” business, i.e., religious non-profits: “None of [the Court’s prior decisions] mentions, let 
alone attributes significance to, the fact that the subject of the challenged communication materially 
affected the corporation’s business.” Id. at 781. 
 215. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). 
 216. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65–66 (1974). 
 217. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 695 (1944). 
 221. Id. at 696. 
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“[t]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a 
personal one, applying only to natural individuals.”222  
In determining whether a constitutional right is “purely personal,” the 
Court did not rely on the distinction between for-profit and non-profit 
corporations. Instead, the Court looked to the nature of the right at issue.
223
 
Even though the labor union was an unincorporated, non-profit 
organization, it still could not claim the privilege against self-
incrimination given the “personal” nature of the right: “[s]ince the 
privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be 
utilized by or on behalf of any organization,”224 regardless of the for-profit 
or non-profit designation.  
Furthermore, White set out a test to determine whether “a particular 
type of organization” can invoke a personal privilege.225 According to the 
Court, an organization such as a union or corporation cannot avail itself of 
a “purely personal” right if it “has a character so impersonal in the scope 
of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or 
represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but 
rather to embody their common or group interests only.”226 By extension, 
unions and corporations—both non-profit and for-profit cannot invoke 
purely personal rights, because they do not represent the personal interests 
of the individuals who comprise those organizations; it is not because “the 
distinction between religious organizations and secular corporations [is] 
meaningful.”227 Instead, unions and corporations “represent[] organized, 
institutional activity as contrasted with wholly individual activity,” their 
existence is “perpetual” and does not “depend[] upon the life of any 
members,” their various activities cannot “be said to be the private 
undertakings of the members,” their officers have no “authority to act for 
the members in matters affecting only the individual rights of such 
members,” they “own[] separate real and personal property,” and “the 
official . . . books and records are distinct from the personal books and 
records of the individuals.”228  
Similarly, in California Bankers Association v. Schultz,
229
 the Court 
once again focused on the personal nature of the constitutional right, not 
 
 
 222. Id. at 698. 
 223. Id. at 704–05. 
 224. Id. at 699 (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. at 701. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 228. White, 322 U.S. at 701–02. 
 229. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The district court in Korte cited to Schulz but only for the proposition 
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the corporate form. The right to privacy applies only to information about 
which the public does not have a right to know. Because “‘law-enforcing 
agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate 
behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest,’” “corporations 
can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to 
privacy.”230 The same holds true for the right against self-incrimination. 
Corporations cannot invoke that privilege because of “the reservation of 
the visitatorial power of the State, and in the authority of the National 
Government where the corporate activities are in the domain subject to the 
powers of Congress.”231  
Schultz, Wilson, and White highlight two important differences between 
purely personal rights and the right to free exercise. First, unlike the 
privacy and self-incrimination contexts, the government has no right to 
satisfy itself that “corporate behavior is consistent with”232 certain state 
approved religious beliefs or practices. As the Court explained in Thomas, 
“religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection.”233 The exercise of religion, unlike the production of business 
documents in Wilson, is not “in the domain subject to the powers of 
Congress.”234 Second, Schultz acknowledges that corporations are 
“endowed with public attributes” and “have a collective impact upon 
society.”235 Under Bellotti, this societal impact is one of the things the 
First Amendment was meant to protect through the speech and religion 
clauses: “The First Amendment in particular, serves significant societal 
interests.”236 To promote these “societal interests,” the speech and religion 
clauses protect against government action that “abridges expression” and 
religious exercise “that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”237 
As a result, the Third Circuit’s and other district courts’ conclusion—
that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion because free exercise 
 
 
that “corporate identity has been determinative of why corporations are denied . . . the right to privacy 
on a par with individuals. Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 
(S.D. Ill. 2012). The district court did not consider the scope of purely personal rights generally. 
 230. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 65–66 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651–52 
(1950)). 
 231. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911). 
 232. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 66 (quoting Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 651–52). 
 233. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
 234. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is 
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith or the 
validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of [their] creeds.”). 
 235. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 65. 
 236. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). 
 237. Id. 
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is a “purely personal” right238—is inconsistent with White, Schultz, and 
Bellotti.
 
Under these precedents, neither non-profits nor for-profits can 
exercise purely personal rights.
239
 But, as the Third and Tenth Circuits, as 
well as the lower federal courts, properly recognize, religious non-profits 
can claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause
240
: “Churches and 
other religious organizations or religious corporations have been accorded 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”241 Given that under White non-
profit corporations do not appear to represent the purely personal interests 
of their members any more than for-profit corporations do, free exercise 
cannot be a purely personal right. Thus, all corporations—those that are 
non-profits and those that are for-profits—should have standing to assert 
claims under the Free Exercise Clause. 
B. The First Amendment Protects Speech and Religious Activity Generally 
and Is Not Limited to Corporations That Are in the “Speech Business” 
or the “Religious Business,” Respectively 
In denying that the Free Exercise Clause applies to for-profit 
corporations, the Third Circuit and several federal district courts suggest 
that the profit-making nature of secular corporations somehow disqualifies 
them from seeking the protections of the First Amendment.
242
 The 
Supreme Court, however, has never made such a distinction. The sole 
proprietors in Lee
243
 and Braunfeld
244
 were engaged in for-profit 
businesses and sought to protect the exercise of their religious beliefs 
 
 
 238. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We do not see how a for-profit ‘artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of law’ that was created to make money could exercise such an 
inherently ‘human’ right.”) (citation omitted). See also Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (S.D. Ill. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 
1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 2012); and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 
394, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 239. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (stating that purely personal rights “cannot 
be utilized by or on behalf of any organization”). 
 240. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602–03 (1983); Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012).  
 241. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. 
 242. See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385 (“We will not draw the conclusion that, just because courts 
have recognized the free exercise rights of churches and other religious entities, it necessarily follows 
that for-profit, secular corporations can exercise religion.”) Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (“We 
find the distinction between religious organizations and secular corporations to be meaningful and 
decline to act as though this difference does not exist.”). 
 243. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 244. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
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through their business operations. The schools in Bob Jones University
245
 
and Hosanna Tabor
246
 were non-profits and sought to generate revenue 
just like for-profit corporations do. Instead of distributing any surplus 
revenue to shareholders, these non-profits simply funneled any surplus 
moneys back into the institutions. Under Bellotti, though, the way in 
which surplus revenue is distributed has no bearing on whether the 
underlying activity implicates the Free Exercise Clause.
247
 In the First 
Amendment context, the focus is on what was done—the particular speech 
or religious activity—not on whether the actor is a non-profit corporation.  
Stated differently, the Third Circuit and the district courts in Korte and 
Hobby Lobby make the same analytical mistake that the lower court made 
in Bellotti when it held “that corporate speech is protected by the First 
Amendment only when it pertains directly to the corporation’s business 
interests.”248 In Bellotti, the Massachusetts Supreme Court improperly 
suggested that only corporations in the “speech business”—media 
corporations and the press—could claim the protection of the free speech 
clause.
249
 Several courts, including the district courts in Korte and Hobby 
Lobby as well as the Third Circuit in Conestoga, do the same thing—
limiting religious exercise to non-profit corporations that are in the 
religion business: “Churches and other religious organizations or religious 
corporations have been accorded protection under the free exercise 
clause because believers ‘exercise their religion through religious 
organizations.’ However, Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not religious 
organizations.”250 On this view, as expressed by Judge Garth in his 
concurrence in denying the motion for an injunction on appeal in 
Conestoga, “the purpose—and only purpose—of the plaintiff Conestoga is 
 
 
 245. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).  
 246. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 247. Just as “the inherent worth of the speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of its source, 
whether corporation, association, union, or individual,” the religious nature of an activity does not 
depend on its source, whether for-profit corporation, non-profit corporation, association, union, or 
individual. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). See also Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We are also troubled—as we believe 
Congress would be—by the notion that Free Exercise rights turn on Congress’s definition of ‘non-
profit.’”). 
 248. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
 249. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 n.13 (1977) (noting 
without deciding that “there may be a difference between the First Amendment rights afforded 
corporations in the business of communications and corporations pursuing general commercial 
interests”), overruled by Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.  
 250. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 2012) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
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to make money!”251 Adopting the district court’s view in Hobby Lobby, 
Judge Garth excludes such profit-making enterprises from the protection 
of the Free Exercise Clause because “‘[g]eneral business corporations . . . 
do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-
motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of 
their individual actors.’”252 In so doing, the courts in Hobby Lobby, 
Conestoga, and Briscoe,
253
 like the district court in Bellotti, impose a 
“novel and restrictive gloss on the First Amendment” by impermissibly 
restricting the Free Exercise Clause to individuals and religious non-
profits.
254
 
The problem is that the Supreme Court’s precedents do not support 
such a “novel and restrictive” interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Bellotti and Citizens United preclude the government’s limiting free 
speech to businesses in the “speech business.”255 Likewise, the Court’s 
reasoning in these cases prohibits the government from restricting free 
exercise to businesses that are in the “religion business” (churches and, 
under the new HHS regulations, “religious employers”)256: “[i]f a 
legislature may direct business corporations to ‘stick to business,’ it also 
may limit other corporations—religious, charitable, or civic—to their 
respective ‘business’ when addressing the public.”257 If, as Judge Garth in 
 
 
 251. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Opinion/Order Re Expedited Motion for Injunction, 2013 WL 1277419 at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) 
(Garth, J., concurring) (concurring in the order denying expedited motion for injunction), aff’d, 724 
F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 252. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. 
Supp. 2d 394, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 253. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291; Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 408; Briscoe v. 
Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (D. Colo. 2013). 
 254. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777; Conestoga Opinion/Order, 2013 WL 
1277419, at *4 (Garth, J., concurring) (“Unlike religious non-profit corporations or organizations, the 
religious liberty relevant in the context of for-profit corporations is the liberty of its individuals, not of 
a profit-seeking corporate entity.”) (emphasis in original).  
 255. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784–85 (“In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is 
constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the 
speakers who may address a public issue.”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (“There is no precedent 
supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as 
media corporations and those which are not.”).  
 256. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
39,870, 39,874 (July 2, 2013) (defining “religious employer” to include only “[h]ouses of worship and 
their integrated auxiliaries). 
 257. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785. In fact, recent developments such as Benefit and B corporations 
further undermine such a narrow view of the corporation as concerned with only profit maximization. 
As Professor Ronald Colombo has noted:  
[o]n a secular level, society appears to have already recognized this, giving form to the 
yearning of investors, customers, employees, and officers to combine and form businesses 
consistent with their particular values and convictions. This is evidenced by developments 
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the Third Circuit contends, the government may require corporations to 
“stick to business,” i.e., profit maximization, then it also may limit civic-
minded or environmentally aware corporations to stick to that same 
business—profit maximization—precluding individuals from using the 
corporate form to advance religious, ethical, environmental, or other social 
values. 
Given that the nature of the underlying conduct, not the identity of the 
speaker, is the central consideration under Bellotti, the Citizens United 
Court emphasized that “‘[i]n the realm of protected speech, the legislature 
is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which 
persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.’”258 
The same should apply to the Free Exercise Clause—if the conduct is 
protected, then the government is disqualified from specifying who can 
exercise religion generally and who can invoke that clause in response to 
the HHS mandate.  
Stated differently, there is nothing about the corporate form or the Free 
Exercise Clause that requires individuals to so limit their individual or 
corporate activities. Although pursuing profits is one purpose of a 
corporation, the officers, directors, and shareholders may decide to 
advance other ends as well—religious, environmental, civic, or political.259 
Ben & Jerry’s and Chick-fil-A provide two well-known examples of 
corporations that advance goals other than profit maximization; these 
examples illustrate the importance of protecting the right of corporations 
to pursue civic or religious values. According to its website, Ben & Jerry’s 
corporate mission involves three goals:  
Social Mission: To operate the Company in a way that actively 
recognizes the central role that business plays in society by 
 
 
both in the marketplace and in state legislatures, such as the promulgation of “Benefit 
Corporation” statues and the “B Corporation” movement.  
Colombo, supra note 84, at 60 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., NY BUS. CORP. § 1707(a)(3) (McKinney 
2012) (stating that in a benefit corporation’s directors and officers “shall not be required to give 
priority to the interests of any particular person or group [including shareholders] . . . over the interests 
of any other person or group”).  
 258. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 347 (2010) (quoting Bellotti, 435 
U.S. at 784–85).  
 259. See, e.g., Professor Kevin C. Walsh, The Third Circuit is wrong: RFRA protects 
corporations, without any carve-out of for-profit corporations from its protections, WALSHLAW (Feb. 
9, 2013), http://walshslaw.wordpress.com/2013/02/09/the-third-circuit-is-wrong-rfra-protects-corporations-
without-any-carve-out-of-for-profit-corporations-from-its-protections/ (“Even a publicly traded 
corporation with an obligation to act in the best interest of shareholders can be ‘socially responsible’ 
and incur various costs in pursuit of long-term value and goodwill.”). 
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initiating innovative ways to improve the quality of life locally, 
nationally and internationally.  
Product Mission: To make, distribute and sell the finest quality all 
natural ice cream and euphoric concoctions with a continued 
commitment to incorporating wholesome, natural ingredients and 
promoting business practices that respect the Earth and the 
Environment.  
Economic Mission: To operate the Company on a sustainable 
financial basis of profitable growth, increasing value for our 
stakeholders and expanding opportunities for development and 
career growth for our employees.
260
 
Although Ben & Jerry’s is a for-profit corporation, only its economic 
mission focuses narrowly on profits. The company also seeks to improve 
“the quality of life” generally and to “promot[e] business practices that 
respect the Earth and the Environment.”261 Under Judge Garth’s view, 
these last two goals are improper because they transcend the only purpose 
of a for-profit corporation—“to make money!”262 Yet Bellotti makes clear 
that the government cannot force companies to give up their First 
Amendment rights and “stick to business.”263 
Similarly, Chick-fil-A predicates its business on biblical values and 
closes its stores on Sundays in observance of the Christian Sabbath.
264
 It 
states that its Corporate purpose is “[t]o glorify God by being a faithful 
steward of all that is entrusted to us. To have a positive influence on all 
who come in contact with Chick-fil-A.”265 In furtherance of its religious 
values, the company has given money to certain advocacy groups that 
promote what Chick-fil-A believes is a Christian view on various issues, 
including marriage. Some of these donations caused national controversy 
in the summer of 2012, leading political leaders in Boston and Chicago to 
threaten to block Chick-fil-A’s bid to open franchises in those cities.266 
 
 
 260. See Our Values, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/values/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2014).  
 261. Id. 
 262. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Opinion/Order Re Expedited Motion for Injunction, 2013 WL 1277419 at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) 
(Garth, J., concurring), aff’d, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 263. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785. 
 264. See Fact Sheets: Chick-Fil-A’s Closed-on-Sunday Policy, CHICK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-
fil-a.com/Pressroom/Fact-sheets/Sunday/Sunday_2012 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
 265. Id.  
 266. Andrew Ryan and Martine Powers, Boston’s Mayor Menino clarifies Chick-fil-A Stance, 
BOSTON GLOBE (July 27, 2012) http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/07/26/menino-clarifies-
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The fact that Chick-fil-A is a for-profit corporation, though, should make 
no difference to the free exercise analysis. Because Chick-fil-A is the 
entity that made the donations and sought to open the stores, Chick-fil-A is 
the “person” that would be injured if retaliated against for the exercise of 
its religious beliefs.
267
  
Given that the Free Exercise Clause would protect a non-profit 
religious organization in such circumstances, under Bellotti, free exercise 
also should protect Chick-fil-A or any other for-profit corporation 
exercising religion. As Bellotti instructs, the First Amendment protects 
“religious exercise” generally, not simply the religious exercise of natural 
persons or religious non-profits.
268
 As a result, if the Free Exercise Clause 
protects an individual’s refusal to do something for religious reasons, it 
should apply when the “person” is a for-profit corporation. The Court has 
held that the Free Exercise Clause reaches an individual’s objection to 
policies, such as the HHS mandate, based on his or her religious beliefs.
269
 
In Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness was denied unemployment benefits after 
he quit his job making turrets for military tanks.
270
 Thomas claimed that he 
terminated his employment because “his religious beliefs prevented him 
from participating in the production of war materials.”271 The Court held 
that the State’s denial of benefits violated Thomas’s free exercise rights: 
“Where the state . . . denies [an important] benefit because of conduct 
mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon 
religion exists.”272  
 
 
view-stance-against-chick-fil/S8zwf3nBeDUXKbWQ6TjExM/story.html; Ricardo Lopez and Tiffany 
Hsu, San Francisco is the Third City to Tell Chick-fil-A: Keep Out, LA TIMES (July 26, 2012) 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/26/business/la-fi-mo-san-franciso-mayor-to-chickfila-keep-out-20 
120726. 
 267. See Colombo, supra note 84 at 67–68.  
 268. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785 (rejecting the claim that the government can restrict business, 
religious, charitable, or civic corporations to what the government determines is their “respective 
business” because “[s]uch power in government to channel the expression of views is unacceptable 
under the First Amendment”).  
 269. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 270. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 711–12. 
 271. Id. at 709. 
 272. Id. at 717–18. The fact that many for-profit corporations may not object to the HHS mandate, 
even though those corporations are owned and operated by individuals with religious beliefs, is 
irrelevant to the free exercise analysis under Thomas:  
[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the 
members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial 
function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more 
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.  
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In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church, was fired after she refused to work on Saturdays, the Sabbath day 
for her faith.
273
 Being unable to find other work as a result of her religious 
beliefs, she filed for unemployment benefits under South Carolina’s 
Unemployment Compensation Act.
274
 The South Carolina Employment 
Security Commission denied her request, claiming that under the Act her 
refusal to work on Saturdays did not constitute good cause for failing to 
accept “suitable work when offered . . . by the employment office or the 
employer.”275 She subsequently filed suit in state court alleging that the 
Commission’s decision infringed on her free exercise rights. The South 
Carolina Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Commission’s 
decision.
276
 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the State could not condition unemployment benefits on the plaintiff’s 
relinquishing her religious convictions,
277
 analogizing such a requirement 
to a fine imposed on religious exercise: 
 
 
Id. at 715–16. 
 273. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. 
 274. Id. at 399–400. 
 275. Id. at 401.  
 276. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the denial of benefits did not infringe 
on Ms. Sherbert’s free exercise of religion for reasons that are very similar to the justifications given 
by several of the district courts that have ruled against the corporations and business owners 
challenging the HHS mandate:  
The State Supreme Court held specifically that appellant’s ineligibility infringed no 
constitutional liberties because such a construction of the statute ‘places no restriction upon 
the appellant’s freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her 
right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her 
conscience.’  
Id. Similarly, the district courts in O’Brien and Grote Industries refused to enter an injunction against 
the HHS mandate because “the challenged regulations do not demand that plaintiffs alter their 
behavior in a manner that will directly and inevitably prevent plaintiffs from acting in accordance with 
their religious beliefs. . . . [P]laintiffs remain free to exercise their religion, by not using contraceptives 
and by discouraging employees from using contraceptives.” O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012); accord Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. 
Supp. 2d 943, 951 (S.D. Ind. 2012).  
 277. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409–10. In fact, as the Court noted in Welsh, the refusal to comply with 
government rules does not even have to be based on a belief in God to qualify as religious exercise:  
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source 
and content but that nevertheless impose on him a duty of conscience to refrain from 
participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that 
individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious persons . . . 
[and] such an individual is as much entitled to a ‘religious’ conscientious objector 
exemption . . . as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional 
religious convictions.  
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (first alteration in original). The same could be said 
of corporations such as Ben & Jerry’s or Chick-fil-A, which pursue secular moral or ethical policies. 
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The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of 
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept 
work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice 
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as 
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
278
 
Yet this is exactly what is happening when for-profit corporations are 
denied free exercise rights in relation to the HHS mandate—the 
government forces compliance with a government program by denying 
corporations an exemption and then penalizing them for non-compliance:  
‘To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of 
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.’ Likewise, to 
condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s 
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith 
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional 
liberties.
279
  
In Sherbert and Thomas, the government sought to condition 
unemployment benefits on the relinquishment of religious beliefs. In the 
HHS mandate situation, the benefit is the limited liability (and other 
advantages) afforded those who incorporate. By forcing for-profit 
corporations (especially closely-held corporations) to provide 
contraception coverage when that coverage is inconsistent with the 
sincerely held religious beliefs of the company’s owners and the resulting 
religious mission of the company, the government places them in a 
position of choosing between paying a fine, acting contrary to their 
religious beliefs, or foregoing their business altogether. The Free Exercise 
Clause precludes the government’s conditioning corporate status on the 
relinquishment of a person’s First Amendment rights.280  
The ACA compels the choice between religious values and forfeiting 
the corporate form through large fines—on companies that refuse to 
provide coverage for all FDA-approved contraception and sterilization 
 
 
As in the HHS litigation, these policies may reflect the ethical views of the owners of these businesses, 
but the policies are those of the corporation.  
 278. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. The Court continued, “It is too late in the day to doubt that the 
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a 
benefit or privilege.” Id.  
 279. Id. at 406 (citation omitted) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
 280. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528–29 (holding that the government cannot impose conditions upon 
public benefits if those conditions operate to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms). 
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procedures. The penalty is imposed on and is payable by the corporation, 
not the individual owners who joined together through the corporate form. 
In Hobby Lobby, the owners estimated the fine ($100 per day for each of 
its 13,000 employees) to be roughly $475 million per year;
281
 in Korte, the 
owners of K&L Contractors would be exposed to a fine of $730,000 per 
year.
282
 As a result, the choice between violating the religious beliefs that 
underscore the corporation and paying potentially ruinous fines 
substantially burdens the corporation’s free exercise of religion. 
Just as the government’s attempt “to channel the expression of views is 
unacceptable under the First Amendment,”283 the effort to channel the free 
exercise of religion to individual worship or religious non-profits is 
likewise unacceptable under the Free Exercise Clause. The decision by 
Chick-fil-A and Hobby Lobby to close on Sundays represents an exercise 
of religion in the same way that the decisions by Ms. Sherbert or the 
merchants in Braunfeld not to work on Saturdays are exercises of 
religion.
284
 In both situations, persons—individuals and for-profit 
businesses—seek to make money through their labor/business, and both 
individuals and closely-held corporations decide not to work/open on 
certain days based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The same principle 
holds true in the HHS mandate cases. Just as the denial of welfare benefits 
punished Sherbert for exercising her religious beliefs, the ACA regulations 
“effectively penalize[] the free exercise” of religion of individuals and 
corporations that seek to follow religious principles in their business and 
professional activities.
285
 This is unconstitutional under Sherbert, Bellotti, 
and Citizens United.
286
 
Extending free exercise protections to all corporations that exercise 
religion (as opposed to only those in the “religion business”) not only is 
required by the Constitution, but it also makes good sense. Corporations, 
whether for-profit or non-profit, do not engage in exclusively religious or 
secular activity. As the Court observed in Hosanna-Tabor, even in “purely 
religious” organizations, there may not be any “employees who perform 
exclusively religious functions”: “The heads of congregations themselves 
often have a mix of duties, including secular ones such as helping to 
 
 
 281. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 282. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 283. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978). 
 284. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Braunfeld v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 285. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
 286. Korte, 735 F.3d at 680 (“If the government is correct that entering the marketplace and 
earning money forfeits free-exercise rights, then Thomas and Sherbert would have been decided 
differently.”). 
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manage the congregation’s finances, supervising purely secular personnel, 
and overseeing the upkeep of facilities.”287 In the same way, not all for-
profit organizations perform exclusively secular functions. As Judge 
Jordan notes in his dissent in Conestoga: 
Judge Garth asserts that “the purpose—and only purpose—of the 
plaintiff Conestoga is to make money!” That assumes the answer to 
the question the Hahns have posed. As a factual matter, it is 
unrebutted that Conestoga does not exist solely to make money. 
This is a closely held corporation which is operated to accomplish 
the specific vision of its deeply religious owners, and, while making 
money is part of that, it has been effectively conceded that they 
have a great deal more than profit on their minds.
288
 
Many faiths, including Catholicism, which is the basis for the ethical 
guidelines that are at issue in several of the ACA challenges direct their 
followers to implement their faith and religious beliefs in their businesses. 
For example, in Vocation of the Business Leader: A Reflection, the 
Vatican’s Pontifical Counsel for Justice and Peace explains that for 
Catholics “[t]he vocation of the businessperson is a genuine human and 
Christian calling.”289 According to the Counsel, one of the greatest 
obstacles to fulfilling this Christian calling  
at a personal level is a divided life, or what Vatican II described as 
“the split between the faith which many profess and their daily 
lives”. . . . Dividing the demands of one’s faith from one’s work in 
business is a fundamental error which contributes to much of the 
damage done by businesses in our world today . . . . The divided life 
is not unified or integrated; it is fundamentally disordered, and thus 
fails to live up to God’s call.290  
As in the HHS mandate cases, many business owners expressly seek to do 
just that—live their religious calling in and through their businesses.291  
 
 
 287. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 708–09 
(2012). 
 288. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Opinion/Order Re Expedited Motion for Injunction, 2013 WL 1277419 at *10 n.8 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 
2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), aff’d, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 289. See PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, VOCATION OF THE BUSINESS LEADER: A 
REFLECTION 5 (2012), available at http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/conferences/Logic%20of 
%20Gift%20Semina/Logic ofgiftdoc/FinalsoftproofVocati.pdf. 
 290. Id. at 6. 
 291. See Korte v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738 (S.D. Ill. 2012) 
(noting that the Kortes believe that they cannot “arrange for, pay for, provide, facilitate, or otherwise 
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Under the district court decisions that deny free exercise rights to for-
profit corporations, however, businesses that desire to “live up to God’s 
call” and implement the values of a particular faith must choose between 
living a “divided life” in a corporation that pays for services deemed 
immoral, forgoing the corporate form altogether, or adhering to their 
religious beliefs and paying penalties and fines. Yet, as the Court has 
acknowledged, the government cannot condition a benefit—such as the 
limited liability that attaches to the corporate form—on the relinquishment 
of one’s free speech or free exercise rights:  
It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and 
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of 
conditions upon a benefit or privilege . . . . [T]o condition the 
availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a 
cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free 
exercise of her constitutional liberties.
292
  
But this is exactly what the district courts have done. They have made 
the for-profit corporate form generally available unless a business owner 
seeks to live her faith through the corporate form. Religiously motivated 
business owners now must commit their companies to conduct that 
violates their faith or conduct their businesses in a manner consistent with 
their religion and pay large fines and penalties.
293
 The Free Exercise 
Clause protects individuals, non-profits, and for-profits from having to 
make this choice between civic benefits and their religious beliefs. The 
government cannot force individuals “to choose between following the 
precepts of [their] religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of [their] religion in order to accept work, 
 
 
support not only contraception and sterilization, but also abortion,” without violating their religious 
beliefs).  
 292. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–06 (1963) (citations and footnote omitted); See also 
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698 (1994) (“It is true that 
religious people (or groups of religious people) cannot be denied the opportunity to exercise the rights 
of citizens simply because of their religious affiliations or commitments, for such a disability would 
violate the right to religious free exercise, which the First Amendment guarantees as certainly as it bars 
any establishment.”) (citation omitted); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
716 (1981) (“More than 30 years ago, the Court held that a person may not be compelled to choose 
between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public 
program.”).  
 293. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a)–(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2006) (providing for a tax of $100 per 
day per employee if a company fails to comply with ACA’s coverage provisions, subject to caps for 
certain failures); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2011) (setting forth an annual tax assessment if a 
company fails to comply with the ACA’s coverage requirements).  
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on the other hand.”294 Or, at a minimum, when the government does do 
this, the individual and the corporation affected may invoke the protection 
of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. 
This discussion of Sherbert is not meant to suggest that Sherbert’s 
compelling interest test necessarily applies to a for-profit corporation’s 
challenge to the HHS mandate. In Smith, the Court expressly stated that 
Sherbert generally has been limited to two situations: (i) the denial of 
unemployment benefits
295
 and (ii) hybrid claims, which involve “the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such 
as freedom of speech and of the press.”296 Whether the current challenges 
to the HHS mandate implicate one or both of these situations goes beyond 
the scope of this Article, although a few brief observations are warranted.  
First, with respect to the proper scope of the Sherbert test, the Court 
noted that heightened scrutiny is appropriate in the unemployment 
compensation context because of the need for “individualized 
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.”297 In 
determining whether an individual qualifies for unemployment benefits, 
the government must determine whether the plaintiff had “good cause” for 
quitting or refusing other work.
298
 This “good cause” standard creates a 
system of individualized exemptions under which the government “may 
not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without 
compelling reason.”299 Under the proposed amendments to the ACA, 
exemptions, like unemployment benefits, are available only to those who 
meet certain regulatory definitions of “religious organization” or “religious 
ministry.”300 Instead of a “good cause” standard under an unemployment 
benefits scheme,
301
 courts have limited free exercise rights to “religious” 
non-profits.
302
 Under such a standard, the district courts must determine in 
 
 
 294. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
 295. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (“We have 
never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of 
unemployment compensation.”). 
 296. Id. at 881. To the extent that the law is not neutral or generally applicable (i.e., the law is 
directed at specific practices), though, strict scrutiny would apply. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 297. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 298. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986). 
 299. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 708). 
 300. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
39,870, 39,874 (July 2, 2013).  
 301. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 712–13 (1981). 
 302. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage in 
religious exercise . . . .”). 
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each case whether an organization is sufficiently religious to qualify for an 
exemption.
303
 To the extent this involves an individualized determination, 
Sherbert’s compelling interest test might apply. 
Second, the HHS mandate cases may involve the type of hybrid 
situation contemplated in Smith: “And it is easy to envision a case in 
which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be 
reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.”304 As the Court explained in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, “[a]n individual’s freedom to speak, to 
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances 
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a 
correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not 
also guaranteed.”305 As the Court acknowledged in Citizens United, 
“[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited 
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and 
distribution of assets.”306 Because the right of association advances First 
Amendment freedoms, “‘[it] is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as 
the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment 
rights.’”307  
Under the HHS mandate, however, the government seeks to do just 
that—condition “those special advantages” of the corporate form on the 
relinquishment of the free exercise of religion through the for-profit 
corporate form. In Citizens United, the Court rejected the distinction 
between “wealthy individuals and unincorporated associations [that] can 
spend unlimited amounts on independent expenditures” and corporations, 
which could not.
308
 The same principle applies here. The district courts 
permit individuals and religious non-profit corporations to object to the 
HHS mandate under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, but “certain 
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate 
form—are penalized for engaging in the same [religious exercise].”309 Just 
 
 
 303. Under the current proposed revisions, to qualify for a religious exemption to the HHS 
mandate an organization must (1) oppose the HHS mandate on account of religious objections, (2) be 
organized and operated as a non-profit, and (3) hold itself out as a religious organization. See 
Coverage of Certain Preventive Service, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874. Given that the proposed amendments 
to the contraceptive coverage requirements have not been finalized, and the various agencies may 
amend the regulations further after the comment period, it is difficult to determine how much 
individualized consideration will be required. 
 304. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 305. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
 306. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (alteration in original). 
 307. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
 308. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356. 
 309. Id. 
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as the government’s attempt to limit the speech rights of corporations 
violated the First Amendment, the government’s predicating the 
availability of certain organizational forms—for-profit corporations—on 
the surrender of free exercise rights also might be unconstitutional under 
Citizens United and Sherbert. 
For present purposes, though, the central point is more limited in scope. 
Under the logic of Citizens United and Sherbert, regardless of the level of 
scrutiny that applies, the government cannot condition the benefits of the 
corporate form on a business owner’s relinquishing her right to exercise 
religion through the corporation.
310
 Non-profit and for-profit corporations, 
like the individuals who comprise them, can engage in religious 
exercise—from closing or refusing to work on Sundays to objecting to the 
HHS mandate on religious grounds—and, consequently qualify for 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 
C. Restricting the Free Exercise Clause to Pervasively Religious 
Organizations Impermissibly Discriminates Against For-Profit 
Corporations That Promote Religious Views 
Several federal courts claim that for-profit corporations cannot invoke 
the Free Exercise Clause because religious exercise is a “purely 
personal”311 right, i.e., a right “applying only to natural individuals.”312 At 
the same time, these courts contend that religious non-profits, which are 
not “natural individuals,” are covered by the Free Exercise Clause because 
of the “religious” nature of the organizations.313 The Third and Sixth 
Circuits as well as several district courts claim religious non-profits are 
fundamentally different from for-profit corporations when it comes to 
exercising religion.
314
 According to Hobby Lobby, which the Third Circuit 
and the district court in Briscoe favorably cite,
315
 “[g]eneral business 
corporations” cannot exercise religion because they “do not pray, worship, 
 
 
 310. Id.; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 311. United States v. White¸ 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). 
 312. Id. at 698. 
 313. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2013) 
(“While religious organizations, as a means by which individuals practice religion, have been afforded 
free exercise rights, courts have consistently limited such holdings to religious organizations.”) 
(citations omitted); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 
2012) (“Churches and other religious organizations or religious corporations have been accorded 
protection under the free exercise clause because believers ‘exercise their religion through religious 
organizations.’”) (citations omitted). 
 314. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291–92. 
 315. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013); Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (D. Colo. 2013). 
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observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate 
and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.”316  
What these courts apparently fail to recognize is that non-profit 
religious organizations also “do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or 
take other religiously-motivated actions”317 independently of the 
individuals who comprise the organization. Religious organizations that 
are non-profit corporations (e.g., a church) do not pray, worship, observe 
sacraments, or take other religious actions as a corporation. All such 
activities are conducted by the individuals who are part of that non-profit 
organization—the priests, religious, and lay members of the faith. The 
same holds true with respect to for-profit corporations. Whether exercising 
their speech rights or implementing their religious beliefs in their business 
operations, for-profit corporations act through the individual 
owners/members of the organization. This is not surprising given the 
distinction between for-profit and non-profit corporations does not consist 
in the latter’s ability to conduct religious activities independently of their 
members. Both types of corporations are creatures of the State that depend 
on individuals to carry out all of their activities—from engaging in speech 
to exercising religion. 
The key is that, in many situations involving non-profit and for-profit 
corporations, the actions of the individuals comprising the organization 
are the actions of the corporations. Discrimination in hiring provides one 
such example. If a corporation—whether for-profit or non-profit—
discriminates against women or minorities, the discrimination is attributed 
to the company, not simply the individuals who own or operate the 
organization. Likewise, if a corporation refuses to hire Jews, Muslims, 
Catholics, or members of some other religion, the corporation is properly 
viewed as and held responsible for the religion-based discrimination.
318
 
 
 
 316. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291–92; see also Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
 317. See Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291–92. 
 318. This is not to say that Congress cannot distinguish between non-profit and for-profit 
corporations with respect to religion under certain circumstances. For instance, Title VII allows some 
not-for-profit corporations to limit hiring to co-religionists while denying that same ability to for-profit 
corporations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (Supp. III 1992); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (“[I]t is a permissible legislative 
purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to 
define and carry out their religious missions.”). In the same way, the ministerial exception that the 
Court recognized in Hosanna-Tabor gives not-for-profit religious organizations the ability to limit the 
hiring of ministers to those who share the organization’s faith given free exercise concerns. Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (“By imposing an 
unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s 
right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”). But the fact that Congress may be 
able to distinguish between for-profit corporations and non-profits in the hiring context to promote free 
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But if a for-profit corporation can discriminate based on religion, there is 
no reason to preclude that company from doing other things based on 
religion. Chick-fil-A and Hobby Lobby can close on Sunday, the Christian 
Sabbath, for religious reasons. Conestoga can implement corporate 
policies that promote specific Mennonite values. And all of these 
companies can refuse—based on religious principles—to provide coverage 
to their employees for specific procedures or drugs related to contraception 
and sterilization. In choosing their health plan coverage, for-profit 
corporations can object to certain procedures and not others based on the 
corporation’s exercise of religion. 
Furthermore, in Larson v. Valente the Court emphasized that “[t]he 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”319 But this is 
precisely what happens when the Third Circuit and federal district courts 
limit free exercise protection to non-profit religious corporations. These 
courts impermissibly discriminate among religions by giving certain 
religions (those that operate through non-profit corporations) the ability to 
exercise religion as a group while denying that opportunity to individuals 
who sincerely try to live their beliefs through all aspects of their lives, 
including their for-profit businesses. As the Tenth Circuit notes in Hobby 
Lobby, “[a] religious individual may enter the for-profit realm intending to 
demonstrate to the marketplace that a corporation can succeed financially 
while adhering to religious values.”320 To preclude this “witness” to one’s 
faith by denying free exercise protection while granting full protections to 
ministers or the religious who evangelize within an established non-profit 
religious organization is discriminate against some religious beliefs in 
direct violation of Larson’s command. 
In Larson, the Court struck down a rule that exempted certain 
organizations from Minnesota’s reporting requirements because the so-
called fifty per cent rule
321
  
 
 
exercise does not give the government the right to distinguish between these two types of corporations 
in derogation of free exercise rights. Moreover, with respect to RFRA, Congress has made no such 
distinction. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person” to include “corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals). 
 319. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); Wilson v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 1282, 1285–88 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that a statutory exemption limited to individuals who are “member[s] of and 
adhere[] to established and traditional tenets . . . of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has 
historically held conscientious objections to [a certain practice]” are unconstitutional because they 
prefer members of established denominations over those with more idiosyncratic religious beliefs).  
 320. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) 
 321. Pursuant to the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, Minn. Stat §§ 309.50–309.61 (1969 & 
Supp. 1982), charitable organizations generally were required to register with the state and file an 
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makes explicit and deliberate distinctions between different 
religious organizations. . . . [T]he provision effectively distinguishes 
between ‘well-established churches’ that have ‘achieved strong but 
not total financial support from their members’ . . . and ‘churches 
which are new and lacking in a constituency, or which, as a matter 
of policy, may favor public solicitation over general reliance on 
financial support from members . . . .’322  
By limiting free exercise to religious non-profits, the federal district 
courts also discriminate in favor of preferred or established religious 
organizations, denying free exercise protection to for-profit corporations 
that are directed at advancing the religious beliefs of their owners. 
Not all religiously motivated people are called to be priests, ministers, 
religious, or lay persons who work for a religious non-profit. Some 
individuals, such as the plaintiffs in the HHS mandate cases, sincerely 
believe they are called to live their faith through their for-profit business 
endeavors.
323
 As Pope John Paul II instructed the Catholic faithful in 
Centesimus Annus:  
In fact, the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a profit, 
but is to be found in its very existence as a community of persons 
who in various ways are endeavoring to satisfy their basic needs, 
and who form a particular group at the service of the whole society. 
Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only 
one; other human and moral factors must also be considered which, 
in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of a 
business.
324
 
The problem under the district court opinions is that two 
organizations—both corporations—that are comprised of members of the 
 
 
annual report that states, among other things, the total receipts and income from all sources, the costs 
of management, fundraising, and public education, and any transfers of property or funds out of the 
state. Larsen, 456 U.S. at 231. The “fifty per cent rule” provided an exemption from the registration 
and reporting requirements but only for “those religious organizations that received more than half of 
their total contributions from members or affiliated organizations.” Id. at 231–32. 
 322. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246–47 n.28.  
 323. Thomas J. Molony, Charity, Truth, and Corporate Governance, 56 LOY. L. REV. 825, 853 
(2010) (“Catholic Social Thought requires, at a minimum, that corporate law allow managers to act in 
a moral manner. A legal norm, therefore, that would require a manager to take an action that is 
immoral is inconsistent with Catholic Social Thought. For this reason, a pure profit maximization 
norm cannot meet the requirements of Catholic Social Thought.”). 
 324. Centesimus Annus: Encyclical Letter on the Hundreth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum from 
John Paul II, § 35 (May 1, 1991), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html (emphasis omitted).  
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same faith may object to the HHS mandate for exactly the same reasons 
but only one—the religious non-profit corporation—may claim the 
protection of the Free Exercise Clause. This result flies in the face of 
Bellotti, which expressly holds that the proper “question must be whether 
[the government regulation] abridges [activity] that the First Amendment 
was meant to protect.”325 Given that religious non-profits are protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause, the First Amendment is meant to protect this 
type of activity—objecting to the contraception coverage mandate on 
religious grounds. The fact that the person conducting the religious 
activity is a “for-profit corporate person” instead of a “natural person” or a 
“non-profit corporate person” is irrelevant.326  
In Bellotti, the Court struck down a state-law ban on corporate 
expenditures related to a referendum because the legislation “amount[ed] 
to an impermissible . . . requirement that the speaker have a sufficiently 
great interest in the subject to justify communication.”327 The same can be 
said of the district courts’ decisions in the HHS mandate cases—they 
require a corporation to have a sufficiently great religious interest in the 
subject to justify objecting on religious grounds. But courts are 
constitutionally prohibited from weighing the nature or importance of a 
person’s or group’s religious beliefs:  
[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are 
shared by all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this 
sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and judicial 
competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker 
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.
328
  
Because courts cannot determine whether a corporation is sufficiently 
religious to invoke the Free Exercise Clause, any corporation that 
sincerely seeks to implement religious beliefs in its corporate activities 
may claim the protection of that clause. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause 
protects the right of individuals and corporations—whether for-profit or 
non-profit—to advance religious beliefs, just as the Free Speech Clause 
protects their right to engage in speech as individuals and through the 
corporate form.
329
  
 
 
 325. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).  
 326. Id. (“The proper question therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment 
rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons.”). 
 327. Id. at 784. 
 328. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981).  
 329. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The Court has 
thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated 
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III. RFRA—SECURING STRICT SCRUTINY FOR CORPORATE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAIMS 
The Court’s reasoning in Citizens United and Bellotti demonstrates that 
the First Amendment protects certain types of activity—whether that 
activity involves speech or religious exercise—regardless of the identity of 
the person who is engaging in that activity.
330
 Recognizing that for-profit 
corporations have free exercise rights is important as a matter of 
constitutional law because it helps to clarify our understanding of the 
scope of the Free Exercise Clause. But it is even more important in 
relation to the ongoing HHS mandate litigation. If the First Amendment 
protects natural and corporate persons, federal courts cannot exclude for-
profit corporations from RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard. Even though the 
free exercise claims of individuals and corporations receive only rational 
basis review under Smith
331
 (if the HHS mandate is neutral and generally 
applicable), if both groups are “persons” under the ACA, then both are 
entitled to heightened protection for substantial burdens on their religious 
exercise. And the government must demonstrate that the HHS Mandate is 
narrowly tailored and is supported by a compelling government interest. 
Under the express terms of RFRA, the “[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion . . . even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability”332 unless the government can 
satisfy strict scrutiny. If the government can “demonstrate[e] that 
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest,” then the burden will be 
upheld.
333
 Any “person” whose religious exercise is burdened in violation 
of RFRA “may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial 
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.”334 Thus, in the context of 
 
 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”).  
 330. Id. at 340–41 (“By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the 
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish 
worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice. . . . The First Amendment protects speech and 
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 
475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining 
whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 
‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to 
foster.”) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783). 
 331. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 332. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (Supp. V 1994). 
 333. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (Supp. V 1994). 
 334. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (Supp. V 1994). RFRA originally applied to State and federal 
governmental actions that substantially burdened religious exercise. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
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corporate challenges to the HHS mandate, the threshold inquiry under 
RFRA mirrors the initial inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause—whether 
the exercise of religion applies only to natural persons or to for-profit 
corporations as well.
335
 
RFRA was meant to restore the pre-Smith strict scrutiny regime for 
federal action that imposes a substantial burden on religious free exercise: 
“Congress passed RFRA to restore the compelling interest test that had 
been applied to laws substantially burdening religious exercise before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.”336 That is, RFRA was intended to 
give greater protection for religious exercise than the current constitutional 
standard under Smith.
337
 Thus, if for-profit corporations are “persons” 
under the Free Exercise Clause, then, barring any statutory language 
excluding for-profit corporations from its coverage, RFRA reinstates 
heightened scrutiny to substantial burdens on the religious exercise of for-
profit corporations. As discussed above, for-profit corporations are 
“persons” under the United States Code338 and, arguably, under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Consequently, RFRA covers for-
profit corporate “persons,” such as the corporate plaintiffs in the HHS 
mandate cases, and any substantial burdens on corporate free exercise 
must satisfy strict scrutiny. 
Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, the United States Code actually 
defines who and what counts as a “person.” Under the Code, “person” 
normally includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.”339 RFRA does not add to or subtract from the general 
definition of “person” in 1 U.S.C. § 1. Accordingly, on its face, RFRA 
appears to include corporations as persons, which is confirmed by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal.
340
 In Gonzales, a Christian Spiritist sect filed suit 
against the government challenging provisions of the Controlled 
 
 
U.S. 507 (1997), the Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to state action because it 
exceeded Congress’s legislative authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 335. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 
2012) (“As was the case with plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, a threshold question here is whether all 
the plaintiffs are in a position to assert rights under RFRA.”).  
 336. Id. 
 337. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that RFRA 
“provides a statutory claim to individuals whose religious exercise is burdened by the federal 
government”). 
 338. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 339. Id. 
 340. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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Substances Act that regulated the use of a hallucinogenic plant in the 
sect’s religious practices.341 Although the Court described the organization 
as a religious sect,
342
 the plaintiff was a non-profit corporation.
343
 The 
Court held that the ban on the use of the hallucinogen imposed a 
substantial burden on the group’s sincere religious practice and that the 
government failed to meet the strict scrutiny burden imposed by RFRA.
344
 
As a result, RFRA required the government to exempt a non-profit 
corporation from the neutral, generally applicable Controlled Substance 
Act.
345
  
Confronted with the text of 1 U.S.C. § 1 and the lack of any language 
in RFRA carving out for for-profit corporations from the definition of 
“person,” the federal district courts employ two related strategies to 
support their view that for-profit corporations cannot assert claims under 
RFRA. First, in the absence of express language carving out for-profit 
corporations from the definition of “person,” these courts have looked to 
“context”346 to distinguish for-profit and non-profit corporations. In 
particular, these courts draw on other language in 1 U.S.C. § 1 that states: 
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context 
indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ includes 
corporations . . . as well as individuals.”347 Context, in turn, “means the 
text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of 
other related congressional Acts, and this is simply an instance of the 
word’s ordinary meaning.”348 While the term “context” has been construed 
narrowly, “[t]he qualification ‘unless the context indicates otherwise,’ is 
intended to assist the court ‘in the awkward case where Congress provides 
 
 
 341. The religious group used the plant to brew a sacramental tea that was ingested as part of the 
religious sect’s communion ritual. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 423. 
 342. In Hobby Lobby, the district court emphasized that “Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal is described in Gonzales as a religious sect. There is no indication it was incorporated.” Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 n.12 (W.D. Okla. 2012). As it turns out, 
the sect in Gonzales is a non-profit corporation. Thus, the critical issue becomes whether RFRA 
distinguishes between non-profit and for-profit corporations. 
 343. See Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal in Santa Fe, New Mexico (NM), 
NONPROFITFACTS.COM, http://www.nonprofitfacts.com/NM/Centro-Espirita-Beneficente-Uniao-Do-
Vegetal.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (listing Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal as a 
non-profit corporation). As the Court made clear in Lukumi, non-profit corporations have free exercise 
rights under the First Amendment. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 525 (1993) (permitting an incorporated church to assert claims under the Free Exercise 
Clause). 
 344. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 439. 
 345. Id. 
 346. See Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. 
 347. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 348. Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993). 
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no particular definition, but the definition in 1 U.S.C. § 1 seems not to 
fit.’”349 Thus, if the context “indicates” that the inclusion of for-profit 
corporations within RFRA “seems not to fit,” these district courts can then 
distinguish non-profit corporations and for-profit corporations, giving 
strict scrutiny protection to the former while denying it to the latter. 
Second, once focused on the context of challenges to the HHS 
mandate, these courts contend that there is a meaningful distinction 
between non-profit and for-profit corporations.
350
 In particular, these 
courts distinguish non-profit corporations and for-profit corporations 
based on their ability to exercise religion. While the former can exercise 
religion, the latter allegedly cannot: 
General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the 
actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, 
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or 
take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the 
intention and direction of their individual actors. Religious exercise 
is, by its nature, one of those “purely personal” matters referenced 
in Bellotti, which is not the province of a general business 
corporation.
351
 
Thus, because (i) for-profit corporations do not exercise religion and 
(ii) free exercise is a “purely personal” right, the context indicates that for-
profit corporations are not “persons” under RFRA.352 
Not surprisingly, the district courts’ argument in the RFRA context 
mirrors their argument relating to the Free Exercise Clause. Although 
framing the discussion in terms of the definition of “person,” the district 
courts actually distinguish non-profit and for-profit corporations based on 
their understanding of what counts as “religious exercise.”353 Their attempt 
to distinguish non-profits and for-profits fails for at least two reasons. 
First, the statutory language in RFRA and 1 U.S.C. § 1 does not 
differentiate between types of corporate persons. Under 1 U.S.C. § 1, 
“person” includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
 
 
 349. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (quoting Rowland, 506 U.S. at 200). 
 350. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2013) 
(“We find the distinction between religious organizations and secular corporations to be meaningful, 
and decline to act as though this difference does not exist.”). 
 351. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. 
 352. Id. 
 353. See Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (concluding that “the Free Exercise Clause . . . is 
unavailable to a secular, for-profit corporation” because such corporations “‘do not pray, worship, 
observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention 
and direction of their individual actors’”) (citation omitted). 
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partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,” not simply religious 
non-profit corporations, companies, associations, firms, and 
partnerships.
354
 The district courts seek to introduce a distinction between 
different types of “persons,” replacing the statutory definition under 
RFRA with their own definition. But there is no statutory or other legal 
basis for defining “person” so narrowly under RFRA. Neither the Supreme 
Court nor the circuit courts have previously held that, as the district court 
pronounced in Conestoga, “a for-profit, secular corporation does not” 
possess free exercise rights.
355
 
Consistent with their analysis of the Free Exercise Clause, the district 
courts that deny for-profit corporations have free exercise rights confront 
an immediate problem. Although they want to exclude for-profit 
corporations from the protection of RFRA, they are forced to acknowledge 
that religious non-profits can exercise religion. In fact, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly permitted non-profit corporations to invoke the protection 
of the Free Exercise Clause.
356
 But if the exercise of religion is a “purely 
personal” right as the district courts contend, then how can religious non-
profits but not for-profit corporations exercise religion? According to the 
courts in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, the answer is the same under 
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause: “religious corporations have been 
accorded protection under the Free Exercise Clause because believers 
‘exercise their religion through religious organizations.’”357 Unlike their 
for-profit counterparts, religious non-profits allegedly “pray, worship, 
observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate 
and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.”358  
As discussed in relation to the Free Exercise Clause, this is 
demonstrably false. All corporations—religious non-profits and secular 
for-profits—act only by and through the individuals who make up the 
organization. Churches like those in Hosanna-Tabor, Lukumi, and Amos 
depend on the ministers and religious who run the organizations to pray, 
worship, and engage in other religiously-motivated activity.
359
 Thus, the 
 
 
 354. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 355. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
 356. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993); Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 357. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (citations omitted). 
 358. Id. at 1291. 
 359. Stated differently, if directly praying and worshiping are necessary to exercise religion, then, 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Hosanna-Tabor and Amos, religious non-profits cannot 
exercise religion. Conversely, if engaging in secular activity disqualifies a corporation for free exercise 
protection, then religious non-profits also do not qualify for such protection. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 
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religious conduct of a non-profit corporation cannot be the constitutionally 
relevant distinction because the non-profit entity does not engage in any 
such conduct qua corporate entity. As Bellotti explains, “[t]he proper 
question . . . is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights 
and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons”360 
but instead “the question must be whether” the religiously motivated 
activity falls within an area “the First Amendment was meant to 
protect.”361 The fact that a religious non-profit could object to the HHS 
mandate under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause, though, shows that 
the First Amendment is meant to protect such religious activity. 
Accordingly, any corporation that exercises religion, be that a non-profit 
or a for-profit corporation, has standing under RFRA and the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
 
IV. ALTHOUGH THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE APPLIES TO FOR-PROFIT 
CORPORATIONS, SUCH CORPORATIONS CAN INVOKE ITS PROTECTION 
ONLY IF THEY EXERCISE RELIGION 
To recognize that corporations, such as Hobby Lobby or Chick-fil-A, 
can raise a free exercise claim is not to determine that a particular 
corporation’s free exercise claim has merit. Rather, acknowledging that 
corporations can invoke the Free Exercise Clause simply permits 
corporations to litigate their claims and to have a neutral court apply the 
appropriate standard under the circumstances—be that rational basis, strict 
scrutiny, or something else. Many corporations—perhaps most—will not 
engage in religious activities or attempt to implement the religious 
convictions of their owners. In particular, large, publicly traded 
corporations may decline to adopt, maintain, or implement a set of 
religious beliefs as part of their business model. A publicly traded 
company could adopt such a business plan if its management and 
shareholders decide to do so, but such cases are apt to be rare.
362
 
 
 
S. Ct. at 709 (“The heads of congregations themselves often have a mix of duties, including secular 
ones such as helping to manage the congregation’s finances, supervising purely secular personnel, and 
overseeing the upkeep of facilities.”). 
 360. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). 
 361. See id.  
 362. See Colombo, supra note 84, at 84 (“Very few corporations could be expected to engage in 
conduct that would be rampantly unpopular, regardless of whether such conduct would be protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause. There would be tremendous market pressure against such actions, especially 
if the corporation was publicly traded, and, as such, needed to concern itself with the capital markets 
as well as the consumer market.”). 
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The key is that there is no constitutional basis for courts to preclude 
such an association a priori. The decision as to what type of business 
model to pursue is left to the corporation—whether publicly or privately 
owned—not the courts. As the Court has acknowledged in the free speech 
context,  
[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of 
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in 
debate on public issues. Acting through their power to elect the 
board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the 
corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are presumed 
competent to protect their own interests. In addition to 
intracorporate remedies, minority shareholders generally have 
access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge 
corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for improper 
corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of 
management.
363
  
The same holds true with respect to corporate decisions to pursue 
religious, environmental, or other civic activities. If a corporation, such as 
Hobby Lobby, is owned and operated by individuals who are deeply 
committed to a particular faith, then it may be unsurprising that the 
company will reflect the religious principles of its owners. As the HHS 
mandate cases demonstrate, corporate plaintiffs adopt ethical guidelines to 
implement religious principles regarding corporate responsibility, 
attempting to promote the well-being of their employees in a financial and 
moral sense. According to these companies, the ACA requires them to 
provide insurance coverage for medical services, such as abortifacients, 
contraceptives, and sterilization, that violate the religious values that 
underscore the companies’ operations. As a result, the ACA infringes on 
the religious activities of these for-profit corporations and requires the 
companies to provide health insurance coverage for medications and 
procedures that are inconsistent with their religious tenets. Therefore, 
because all corporations can exercise religion (even if not all do) and 
RFRA does not exclude for-profit corporations from its coverage, for-
profit corporations can invoke the Free Exercise Clause to protect their 
religious activities, and the courts are left to determine whether that claim 
is meritorious under the appropriate standard. 
 
 
 363. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 (footnote omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
Freedom of religion is frequently viewed as the “first freedom” under 
our Constitution.
364
 This is due in part to the fact that the religion clauses 
are contained in the first lines of the First Amendment.
365
 But the primacy 
placed on religious exercise also reflects the important role religion has 
played in our nation’s history and that it continues to play in the lives of 
millions of Americans—in their homes, families, places of worship, and 
even their businesses.  
The HHS mandate challenges this first freedom in a unique way. By 
requiring business owners and their companies to provide coverage for 
contraceptive drugs and sterilization procedures that are contrary to their 
religious beliefs, the HHS mandate pits free exercise against the regulatory 
power of the federal government. More specifically, it raises an entirely 
novel free exercise question: whether for-profit corporations can exercise 
religion for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. While the 
courts have recognized that individuals and religious non-profit 
organizations have standing to challenge the HHS mandate, to date no 
District Court has held that for-profit corporations can bring claims on 
their own behalf under RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause. 
The HHS mandate cases, therefore, provide the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the scope of 
this first freedom. Building on the Supreme Court’s recognition in Citizens 
United that “First Amendment protection extends to corporations,”366 the 
courts should expressly acknowledge that religious exercise “does not lose 
First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a 
corporation.’”367 Contrary to the district courts in Hobby Lobby, Korte, and 
Conestoga, the first freedom is not a “purely personal” right limited only 
to natural persons.
368
 Rather, “[t]he First Amendment, in particular, serves 
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significant societal interests.”369 For-profit corporations, like the 
individuals who comprise them and their non-profit counterparts, help 
advance those societal interests by enabling individuals to come together 
“for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and 
the exercise of religion.”370 Neither the “profit motive” of a for-profit 
corporation nor the “religious nature” of religious organizations justifies 
limiting the Free Exercise Clause only to individuals and non-profit 
religious organizations. Although many (perhaps most) corporations may 
choose not to engage in religious activities, there is no constitutional basis 
for precluding a priori all for-profit businesses from raising free exercise 
claims. As the HHS mandate cases demonstrate, some corporations do 
exercise religion through their business policies and guidelines, and the 
courts should recognize that they have standing to assert their first 
freedom under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. 
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